Well, can you just put it all down to a natural cycle? The right wins at one election and at the next one it loses. We'll have to wait four years to know if this was some form of cyclical occurrence or something more permanent. What cards might get stacked up against the victors of 2015 come 2019? Might these cards consign them to electoral massacre?
Let's be in no doubt, the Partido Popular has suffered a massacre. For all the brave words about economic recovery, time had run out, as had patience: austerity, corruption and no small amount of mean-spiritedness all played a part. As had miscalculation. The PP is a party too consumed with the past and with a wish to make it the future. Abortion, Catholic conservatism, the "gagging" law: they all crept in to the mix and were rejected. They will also be rejected at the general election. Rajoy will gain the most votes but he will lose. Time for him has all but run out; the regions of Spain allied against him, he is a dead politician limping.
Rajoy will hope that there will be some screwball carryings-on that the PP can latch onto between now and the general election; it really is his only hope. But it is likely to be a forlorn one. Mallorca, the Balearics, Spain haven't so much lurched to the left as been shifted there by a colossal movement of political tectonic plates. Yet, this is not a left in a traditional sense. PSOE cannot look to the future with any great optimism and nor can it rejoice in its performance on 24 May. The Balearics was not untypical. PSOE loses seats but may still manage to head an administration. It will be a position of weakness not of strength. PSOE has to recognise, if it hadn't already, that the rules have changed. But the question it will ask itself is - does this represent only a temporary remoulding of left-leaning politics and indeed of Spain's politics overall? No one can properly or adequately answer this.
Rajoy might also draw some perverse comfort from Greece. As that country stumbles along, closing in on default, avoiding it, seeking another negotiation, he can raise the Syriza flag as a warning of what might be. But even this is too late, and he has contributed to this. He has made the economy too good. A coalition that will replace him may find room for Podemos, but only room. Austerity might be lifted but Podemos would only be one of the architects. The regional elections offer this proof. Podemos will not be a Syriza, and even were it to be, it no longer follows that Podemos would be reckless. It could not back track on anti-austerity, but its chameleon nature affords it an inherent restraint that once appeared not to be evident.
But any plan to demonise Podemos - demonise it further - could backfire. It would be the demonisation of newness, coming from a party with its roots in the past. The PP, Rajoy are left flailing around, unloved, as grey and uncharismatic as Rajoy himself is, screaming growth above all the shouts of corruption and the echoes of the past. People aren't listening. They have grown tired of the Rajoys. They gave them one more go, but by default rather than desire. They never loved the PP, even when they were sending them to the landslides in 2011.
Yes, it is the economy, stupid, and it was this which undid Zapatero and Antich in the Balearics, but screaming the economy goes only so far. The miscalculation, the mean-spiritedness were assaults on what PSOE had brought about in social and cultural terms. The people didn't want to lose these. They were willing to accept that an unpleasant dose to cure the economy was to come, but they were not willing to turn their backs on modernity or on cultural gains. Rajoy's miscalculation was also Bauzá's: he was simply wrong to have done what he did with Catalan. The divisions in society were predicted before he became president. They were right. And when Podemos and the progenitors of Guanyem in Barcelona ran with the baton of the indignados and 15-M and exposed the hideous realities of the sufferings of the evicted, comdemned for all time to a debt that they would never be able to pay off, the mean spirit of the reaction was greater than the small scraps of sympathy. Loathing. No party can survive that. Fear for and within the PP has taken over.
And loathing has put paid to Bauzá. Loathing from within his party and from without. He will go with his head held low, the leader who led his party to its worst-ever electoral performance, the consequence of several factors, one of which was him.
Showing posts with label Regional elections. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Regional elections. Show all posts
Thursday, May 28, 2015
Tuesday, April 21, 2015
The Morality Of Proportional Representation
Alberto Nuñez Feijoo is the president of Galicia. A Partido Popular man, he was in Menorca on Sunday at a pre-election regional convention, praising the efforts of President Bauzá but also making observations that go to the very heart of the electoral system in Spain.
There is no such thing as the perfect electoral system. First past the post has the virtues of simplicity and acceptance of the wishes of a majority, but it has the drawback of non-representation of the losing minority. Proportional representation (PR) is designed to address this, but it also has a significant flaw - it can lead to administrations being formed in which the winners, i.e. those who receive the most votes, can be and quite often are excluded.
It was this point to which Feijoo was specifically alluding. He said that "in the PP we know that if we don't win (i.e. get a majority), we cannot govern". He then added, perhaps confusingly, that "if we win, this should correspond to our governing", by which he meant that even if a majority is not achieved, the fact of having gained more electoral support than any other party should guarantee a role in government.
The Balearics is a good example of what he is saying. The PP gained a majority of seats in the 2011 parliamentary election, so there was no grey area. The party won more than the 30-seat threshold and was able to govern alone. In the upcoming election, it is unlikely that it will gain a majority. With allies among other parties all but non-existent, it would be deprived of a role in government through coalition even if - and this will surely be the case - it secures the most seats and also the greatest percentage share of the vote.
Last summer, Feijoo declared his support for a reform in the way that mayors are elected. The Rajoy government was proposing a change, which would have applied only to municipalities, whereby a party gaining 40% of the share of the vote or a clear seven per cent lead over the next party would be guaranteed having its mayoral candidate elected. This reform was due to have been taken to Congress for approval in the autumn, but in the end it was shelved because of an inability to gain support from other parties. Reforms such as this, as President Bauzá has discovered in the Balearics, require more than just having a majority in parliament; they need a qualified majority. Bauzá's wish to reduce the number of deputies in the Balearic Parliament was denied because he couldn't raise the qualified majority from opposition parties which objected to the reduction.
Opponents of the Rajoy reform argued that it was one designed to ensure that the PP, faced with declining support, was able to still keep power. An analysis of the 2011 elections in the Balearics revealed that, had such a system operated then, there wouldn't have been any major differences to the results, but that was 2011 when the PP polled very much better than they will do this year. 40% shares of votes or even seven per cent leads are going to be mightily difficult to obtain.
All this is, for the time being, hypothetical because there is no reform and, where regional elections were concerned, it was not one that had been proposed. Nevertheless, Feijoo was advancing the case for a first past the post-PR hybrid to apply in the Balearics. In so doing, he was making a moral observation rather than one based on the system as it is currently applied.
Does he have a case? Under the current system he doesn't but morally he may well do. He said that "politics is a contract with the citizens and with the polls based on democracy and the free expression of society". And this democracy is such that if the PP gains, as opinion polls suggest, the most seats in the regional parliament and a percentage share of the vote around 32%, it could find itself excluded from government. The free expression of 32% of society would be ignored.
PR does give voice to smaller parties and to wider society, but it can also penalise. Somehow, it seems wrong that a "winning" party should not find a place in government. This said, however, if Feijoo were to get his wish, Bauzá as a possible head of a government comprising all manner of left-wing representatives would be a recipe for even greater chaos than one that solely comprises these representatives.
There is no perfect system, but because PR is imperfect and because it will often throw up anomalies, perhaps it is beholden on parties to adopt more consensual and less confrontational postures towards rival parties. This can very much be said of Bauzá. Morality is one thing; popularity, or its absence, is quite another.
There is no such thing as the perfect electoral system. First past the post has the virtues of simplicity and acceptance of the wishes of a majority, but it has the drawback of non-representation of the losing minority. Proportional representation (PR) is designed to address this, but it also has a significant flaw - it can lead to administrations being formed in which the winners, i.e. those who receive the most votes, can be and quite often are excluded.
It was this point to which Feijoo was specifically alluding. He said that "in the PP we know that if we don't win (i.e. get a majority), we cannot govern". He then added, perhaps confusingly, that "if we win, this should correspond to our governing", by which he meant that even if a majority is not achieved, the fact of having gained more electoral support than any other party should guarantee a role in government.
The Balearics is a good example of what he is saying. The PP gained a majority of seats in the 2011 parliamentary election, so there was no grey area. The party won more than the 30-seat threshold and was able to govern alone. In the upcoming election, it is unlikely that it will gain a majority. With allies among other parties all but non-existent, it would be deprived of a role in government through coalition even if - and this will surely be the case - it secures the most seats and also the greatest percentage share of the vote.
Last summer, Feijoo declared his support for a reform in the way that mayors are elected. The Rajoy government was proposing a change, which would have applied only to municipalities, whereby a party gaining 40% of the share of the vote or a clear seven per cent lead over the next party would be guaranteed having its mayoral candidate elected. This reform was due to have been taken to Congress for approval in the autumn, but in the end it was shelved because of an inability to gain support from other parties. Reforms such as this, as President Bauzá has discovered in the Balearics, require more than just having a majority in parliament; they need a qualified majority. Bauzá's wish to reduce the number of deputies in the Balearic Parliament was denied because he couldn't raise the qualified majority from opposition parties which objected to the reduction.
Opponents of the Rajoy reform argued that it was one designed to ensure that the PP, faced with declining support, was able to still keep power. An analysis of the 2011 elections in the Balearics revealed that, had such a system operated then, there wouldn't have been any major differences to the results, but that was 2011 when the PP polled very much better than they will do this year. 40% shares of votes or even seven per cent leads are going to be mightily difficult to obtain.
All this is, for the time being, hypothetical because there is no reform and, where regional elections were concerned, it was not one that had been proposed. Nevertheless, Feijoo was advancing the case for a first past the post-PR hybrid to apply in the Balearics. In so doing, he was making a moral observation rather than one based on the system as it is currently applied.
Does he have a case? Under the current system he doesn't but morally he may well do. He said that "politics is a contract with the citizens and with the polls based on democracy and the free expression of society". And this democracy is such that if the PP gains, as opinion polls suggest, the most seats in the regional parliament and a percentage share of the vote around 32%, it could find itself excluded from government. The free expression of 32% of society would be ignored.
PR does give voice to smaller parties and to wider society, but it can also penalise. Somehow, it seems wrong that a "winning" party should not find a place in government. This said, however, if Feijoo were to get his wish, Bauzá as a possible head of a government comprising all manner of left-wing representatives would be a recipe for even greater chaos than one that solely comprises these representatives.
There is no perfect system, but because PR is imperfect and because it will often throw up anomalies, perhaps it is beholden on parties to adopt more consensual and less confrontational postures towards rival parties. This can very much be said of Bauzá. Morality is one thing; popularity, or its absence, is quite another.
Wednesday, April 08, 2015
Vote For The Monkey
You know those poll things you get on websites. A simple question or a list of alternatives; click here to register your vote. I don't normally bother, but there were two on one particular news website that made me do so. The simple question was - do you think Magalluf will be cleaned up this summer (or words to that effect)? A daft question. No, I duly clicked, and joined the 80% who thought likewise. The more difficult question, the list of alternatives, was and still is - which candidate for the presidency (of the Balearics) generates the most confidence?
These questions probably don't make you think too closely, but this one did. When the list of names was presented, and the choice had to be made to combine any of the candidates with "confidence", clicking was not easy. Here is the list: José Ramón Bauzá (PP): Francina Armengol (PSOE); Biel Barceló (Més); Alberto Jarabo (Podemos); Juan Antonio Horrach (UPyD); Jaume Font (Proposta per les Illes. i.e. El Pi); No candidate (Ciutadans, aka Ciudadanos); No candidate (Guanyem); None of the above.
I recognise that most of you living in Mallorca will not be able to vote for any of them, even if you were inclined to, but such is the idiosyncrasy of Spanish voting as permitted under the Maastricht Treaty: an EU foreign resident can, for example, vote for a regional Scottish Parliament but not for a regional parliament in Spain. Hey ho.
But able to vote or not, one of those listed above will, come June, be ordained as the next president of the Balearics. The closer I looked at the list and the closer I thought about each of them, the more I shivered, especially when it occurred to me that maybe it was better the devil you know. How could I? Bauzá? I had to be kidding.
As it happens, Bauzá was well ahead. As of Tuesday evening, he had 32% of the 2291 votes cast. Now, the website in question is that of a newspaper with right-wing leanings, but it certainly doesn't follow that its readers are right-wing. I'm not, but I read it, just as I read "The Telegraph", but wouldn't opt for Cameron. And there was confirmation of the spectrum of political views with the other votes. Like, for example, 11% for Biel Barceló of the Més Majorcan socialists-nationalists-greens or - in second place - 19% for Guanyem, a party with no candidate, but a party nonetheless that is hard to differentiate from Podemos, whose Alberto Jarabo only had 6%.
I suspect that there may have been a touch of social media-led support for Guanyem, but if there wasn't, for a party about which even less is known than Podemos and one without a named candidate to then come second is a fairly damning indictment of the alternatives on offer. Damning but not entirely surprising.
The lowest percentage, one point behind the UPyD guy and Jarabo, was that for Francina Armengol. In normal circumstances, you would expect PSOE to be doing much better and for there to be greater confidence in her. But circumstances aren't normal. PSOE have failed to make any impression since their dismal showing in 2011. They're not a spent force, but they are a force that has been undermined by new arrivals and the absence of a narrative that hints at their renewal.
Despite this lousy polling, despite this lack of confidence, Armengol may well become president at the head of raggle-taggle coalition. The Bauzá message at present is that only the PP can guarantee stability (in a political sense). A pact of the left would not inspire confidence is what he is saying. And the sad fact is that he is probably right. As I've mentioned before, I could see a coalition collapsing under the weight of efforts to grab power by the competing components and of its incompatible ideologies.
But I had to ask myself again. Bauzá? For all that he may have presided over something of an economic recovery (and he does deserve some credit, considering what he inherited), he has otherwise caused division in Balearic society and within his own party. He has failed to, for instance, right the wrongs of the financing from Madrid. He has abrogated any real responsibility for tourism, throwing the island's principal industry open to narrow private-sector interests and doing little to expand the attractiveness of the islands for any more than a handful of months in summer.
Confidence? Confidence in any of this lot? My click hovered over one or two before I finally decided. It was a pity that Micky the Monkey wasn't among the options. He would probably be as good as any. As he wasn't, I became part of the 0%, the not even registering eight who voted for None of the above.
These questions probably don't make you think too closely, but this one did. When the list of names was presented, and the choice had to be made to combine any of the candidates with "confidence", clicking was not easy. Here is the list: José Ramón Bauzá (PP): Francina Armengol (PSOE); Biel Barceló (Més); Alberto Jarabo (Podemos); Juan Antonio Horrach (UPyD); Jaume Font (Proposta per les Illes. i.e. El Pi); No candidate (Ciutadans, aka Ciudadanos); No candidate (Guanyem); None of the above.
I recognise that most of you living in Mallorca will not be able to vote for any of them, even if you were inclined to, but such is the idiosyncrasy of Spanish voting as permitted under the Maastricht Treaty: an EU foreign resident can, for example, vote for a regional Scottish Parliament but not for a regional parliament in Spain. Hey ho.
But able to vote or not, one of those listed above will, come June, be ordained as the next president of the Balearics. The closer I looked at the list and the closer I thought about each of them, the more I shivered, especially when it occurred to me that maybe it was better the devil you know. How could I? Bauzá? I had to be kidding.
As it happens, Bauzá was well ahead. As of Tuesday evening, he had 32% of the 2291 votes cast. Now, the website in question is that of a newspaper with right-wing leanings, but it certainly doesn't follow that its readers are right-wing. I'm not, but I read it, just as I read "The Telegraph", but wouldn't opt for Cameron. And there was confirmation of the spectrum of political views with the other votes. Like, for example, 11% for Biel Barceló of the Més Majorcan socialists-nationalists-greens or - in second place - 19% for Guanyem, a party with no candidate, but a party nonetheless that is hard to differentiate from Podemos, whose Alberto Jarabo only had 6%.
I suspect that there may have been a touch of social media-led support for Guanyem, but if there wasn't, for a party about which even less is known than Podemos and one without a named candidate to then come second is a fairly damning indictment of the alternatives on offer. Damning but not entirely surprising.
The lowest percentage, one point behind the UPyD guy and Jarabo, was that for Francina Armengol. In normal circumstances, you would expect PSOE to be doing much better and for there to be greater confidence in her. But circumstances aren't normal. PSOE have failed to make any impression since their dismal showing in 2011. They're not a spent force, but they are a force that has been undermined by new arrivals and the absence of a narrative that hints at their renewal.
Despite this lousy polling, despite this lack of confidence, Armengol may well become president at the head of raggle-taggle coalition. The Bauzá message at present is that only the PP can guarantee stability (in a political sense). A pact of the left would not inspire confidence is what he is saying. And the sad fact is that he is probably right. As I've mentioned before, I could see a coalition collapsing under the weight of efforts to grab power by the competing components and of its incompatible ideologies.
But I had to ask myself again. Bauzá? For all that he may have presided over something of an economic recovery (and he does deserve some credit, considering what he inherited), he has otherwise caused division in Balearic society and within his own party. He has failed to, for instance, right the wrongs of the financing from Madrid. He has abrogated any real responsibility for tourism, throwing the island's principal industry open to narrow private-sector interests and doing little to expand the attractiveness of the islands for any more than a handful of months in summer.
Confidence? Confidence in any of this lot? My click hovered over one or two before I finally decided. It was a pity that Micky the Monkey wasn't among the options. He would probably be as good as any. As he wasn't, I became part of the 0%, the not even registering eight who voted for None of the above.
Monday, March 23, 2015
Andalusia Is Spain: Regional election
Andalusia is the Spain we were sold. When the country ended its exile, the world was sold Andalusia: a vivid kaleidoscope of reds, blacks, oranges and yellows. Flamenco, bullfighting, citrus and heat: searing heat. Where Europe met Africa, Andalusia was a place apart, the exotica of its imagery etched firmly into a foreign consciousness. Spain was Andalusia.
Andalusia is still a place apart. While the whole of Spain suffered because of economic crisis, Andalusia suffered more than most. But it has always suffered. For all its imagery, complemented by the Costa del Sol, the golf courses, the marinas, the grand cities, it has always been a poor region. GDP per capita is the second lowest in Spain; only its neighbour Extremadura is poorer. Not that help has not been forthcoming. Over the years, roughly 50,000 million euros of European funds have been spent on it, but it has never remotely looked like becoming "one of Europe's most prosperous regions", as its former president, Manuel Chaves, said that by 2020 it would be. Youth unemployment, at desperate levels because of crisis, were at their worst in Andalusia and still are. The young of Andalusia, seduced by the good money of construction for tourism and foreign property buyers, preferred the building site to education, but when the building stopped they had nowhere to go except back to their families when the houses they had bought with the wages of concrete and with all-too-easy mortgages were repossessed.
It is a place apart in a political sense. Since it obtained autonomous community status in 1981 and started to elect its own regional government the following year, Andalusia has never known anything other than socialism; the PSOE brand of socialism. On Sunday, the people of Andalusia voted, the opinion polls confident that the PSOE dynasty was not about to be ended.
Susana Díaz became president in September 2013 when José Griñán stepped down. In January she ended the coalition with the IU (United Left) that PSOE had been forced into after the last election. The relationship between the two parties had deteriorated, as had that between Díaz and the leader of the IU, Antonio Maíllo. An election had to be called. Two months before other regional elections, the interest in it has been greater than it would otherwise have been. Here was the first real measure of how Podemos would do. Here also was a test of the centre-left Ciudadanos, which has appeared from almost nowhere to feature significantly in national opinion polls. But here also were potential indications of what other elections - regional and national - might hold for PSOE and the Partido Popular. For PSOE, defeat in Andalusia would be unthinkable, but a lowering of its percentage of the vote in 2012 (39.6%) would border on the disastrous; a confirmation of the inroads made by Podemos. The PP would know that the 40.7% of the 2012 vote was going to slump. But by how much? Though a PSOE stronghold, its share of the vote had generally been an upward one since 1990 when it could only just muster 22%.
As things turned out, disaster did strike. Susana Díaz said the victory was "historic", and it was; historic in the low percentage of the vote. PSOE won the same number of seats (47) as in 2012, but its share of the vote was down by over 4%. For the PP, a loss of 14% and 17 seats was bad but not as bad as opinion polls had suggested. Podemos, as had been expected, came in third, its performance in line with those opinion polls (15 seats and almost 15% of the share of the vote). The Ciudadanos surge was not as great as had been predicted (9 seats and just over 9% of the vote).
So, how does one interpret all this as an indication of what might happen in the other elections to come? Because of the strength of PSOE in Andalusia, it was always going to win, and this despite the corruption cases that have afflicted it in the region. Its 35.4% share of the vote is vastly greater than how it is performing in national opinion polls, the latest three of which have given it an average 19.3% share, but it probably says very little about other elections, other than to confirm that PSOE has failed to reassert itself against the PP. It is a hollow victory, and the PSOE hierarchy will know that it is.
The PP's share of the vote, poor though it was, was higher than how it currently rates in national opinion polls. There may be some consolation in this but it is certainly not a performance that will fill it with confidence. For the PP, PSOE isn't really the threat; it is the other parties.
There is a misguided view that Podemos is only killing PSOE. This simply isn't so, as the loss of support that the PP is suffering is due in no small part to Podemos and others. For Podemos, the Andalusia vote went much as had been anticipated. The share of the vote is seven points lower than how it is rated in national opinion polls, but the strength of PSOE in Andalusia was always going to mean that it couldn't match these national levels.
It would be overstating things to say that Podemos was the real victor in Andalusia, but the vote proves that when the electorate turns up to vote it doesn't suddenly have a change of heart and opt instead for the status quo of one or other of the two main parties. Podemos, and to a lesser extent Ciudadanos, have genuinely arrived.
Andalusia, as it always has been, is a place apart. The election confirms this only in terms of PSOE's victory. Otherwise, the election shows that it is Spain, and for Spain, Andalusia now poses a big question - with which party does PSOE form a coalition? If it is Podemos, then the shape of Spain's politics for the next four to five years may well have been formed in Andalusia.
Andalusia is still a place apart. While the whole of Spain suffered because of economic crisis, Andalusia suffered more than most. But it has always suffered. For all its imagery, complemented by the Costa del Sol, the golf courses, the marinas, the grand cities, it has always been a poor region. GDP per capita is the second lowest in Spain; only its neighbour Extremadura is poorer. Not that help has not been forthcoming. Over the years, roughly 50,000 million euros of European funds have been spent on it, but it has never remotely looked like becoming "one of Europe's most prosperous regions", as its former president, Manuel Chaves, said that by 2020 it would be. Youth unemployment, at desperate levels because of crisis, were at their worst in Andalusia and still are. The young of Andalusia, seduced by the good money of construction for tourism and foreign property buyers, preferred the building site to education, but when the building stopped they had nowhere to go except back to their families when the houses they had bought with the wages of concrete and with all-too-easy mortgages were repossessed.
It is a place apart in a political sense. Since it obtained autonomous community status in 1981 and started to elect its own regional government the following year, Andalusia has never known anything other than socialism; the PSOE brand of socialism. On Sunday, the people of Andalusia voted, the opinion polls confident that the PSOE dynasty was not about to be ended.
Susana Díaz became president in September 2013 when José Griñán stepped down. In January she ended the coalition with the IU (United Left) that PSOE had been forced into after the last election. The relationship between the two parties had deteriorated, as had that between Díaz and the leader of the IU, Antonio Maíllo. An election had to be called. Two months before other regional elections, the interest in it has been greater than it would otherwise have been. Here was the first real measure of how Podemos would do. Here also was a test of the centre-left Ciudadanos, which has appeared from almost nowhere to feature significantly in national opinion polls. But here also were potential indications of what other elections - regional and national - might hold for PSOE and the Partido Popular. For PSOE, defeat in Andalusia would be unthinkable, but a lowering of its percentage of the vote in 2012 (39.6%) would border on the disastrous; a confirmation of the inroads made by Podemos. The PP would know that the 40.7% of the 2012 vote was going to slump. But by how much? Though a PSOE stronghold, its share of the vote had generally been an upward one since 1990 when it could only just muster 22%.
As things turned out, disaster did strike. Susana Díaz said the victory was "historic", and it was; historic in the low percentage of the vote. PSOE won the same number of seats (47) as in 2012, but its share of the vote was down by over 4%. For the PP, a loss of 14% and 17 seats was bad but not as bad as opinion polls had suggested. Podemos, as had been expected, came in third, its performance in line with those opinion polls (15 seats and almost 15% of the share of the vote). The Ciudadanos surge was not as great as had been predicted (9 seats and just over 9% of the vote).
So, how does one interpret all this as an indication of what might happen in the other elections to come? Because of the strength of PSOE in Andalusia, it was always going to win, and this despite the corruption cases that have afflicted it in the region. Its 35.4% share of the vote is vastly greater than how it is performing in national opinion polls, the latest three of which have given it an average 19.3% share, but it probably says very little about other elections, other than to confirm that PSOE has failed to reassert itself against the PP. It is a hollow victory, and the PSOE hierarchy will know that it is.
The PP's share of the vote, poor though it was, was higher than how it currently rates in national opinion polls. There may be some consolation in this but it is certainly not a performance that will fill it with confidence. For the PP, PSOE isn't really the threat; it is the other parties.
There is a misguided view that Podemos is only killing PSOE. This simply isn't so, as the loss of support that the PP is suffering is due in no small part to Podemos and others. For Podemos, the Andalusia vote went much as had been anticipated. The share of the vote is seven points lower than how it is rated in national opinion polls, but the strength of PSOE in Andalusia was always going to mean that it couldn't match these national levels.
It would be overstating things to say that Podemos was the real victor in Andalusia, but the vote proves that when the electorate turns up to vote it doesn't suddenly have a change of heart and opt instead for the status quo of one or other of the two main parties. Podemos, and to a lesser extent Ciudadanos, have genuinely arrived.
Andalusia, as it always has been, is a place apart. The election confirms this only in terms of PSOE's victory. Otherwise, the election shows that it is Spain, and for Spain, Andalusia now poses a big question - with which party does PSOE form a coalition? If it is Podemos, then the shape of Spain's politics for the next four to five years may well have been formed in Andalusia.
Wednesday, February 25, 2015
It's Back: The eco-tax
So, it's pretty much official. It has yet to be ratified, but a Balearics eco-tax, or a tax on tourists under some other name, will in all likelihood feature in the manifestos of Podemos, Més and PSOE. If, as seems possible, these three parties form a coalition government, an eco-tax it almost certainly will be.
It comes as no surprise that Podemos and Més should favour such a tax. PSOE is more of a surprise. I had previously doubted that PSOE would wish to revisit the crash scene of a tax it was responsible for introducing during its first administration (the pact of 1999-2003). The PSOE hierarchy might, when push comes to manifesto shove, take the view that it is too emotive an issue and too much of a risk, but Cosme Bonet, one of the party's electoral programme co-ordinators, appears to believe it is a risk worth taking in order that "tourism contributes to the conservation of the environment". He prefers to not refer to the tax as an eco one, but eco-tax is precisely what it would be.
Bonet has also said that it would be a tax with the consensus of the tourism sector. If he believes there will be consensus, he is probably deluding himself. The hoteliers, for one, will take a great deal of persuading. It was, after all, they who got the Matas Partido Popular administration from 2003 to abandon PSOE's unpopular tax. There again, the hoteliers had every reason to have been indignant with the old tax. It was they who shouldered the burden for its collection. One of the flaws of the eco-tax was that it was discriminatory; it was not applied to non-hotel accommodation.
This time, as far as the Més spokesperson David Abril is concerned, the hoteliers will not be singled out. The tax would be universal, and by that he means the inclusion of private holiday accommodation, currently not regulated, that Més would regulate. As PSOE has previously suggested that it would also seek regulation and as Podemos has intimated as much, a tax would apply more widely, just as it does in Catalonia, where private accommodation is properly registered and regulated. But this will hardly be a move to mollify the hoteliers or guarantee a consensus.
Tourist taxes are the flavour of the moment and not only among the Balearics left. In the Canaries, the Nueva Canarias party has presented a proposal for a tax to the regional parliament. Its purpose would be to raise additional funds for modernising outdated resorts and tourist services. The party reckons that 100 million euros could be raised. The hoteliers in the Canaries are dead against the idea. Among reasons for their objections is the Balearics eco-tax fiasco. Others include arguments that the sector is over-taxed as it is and that far too little of the revenue raised by the Canaries' tourism sector actually finds its way back into the system. This is a reasonable argument. The tourism sector generates tax revenues of over 1,500 million euros annually, yet, as an example, only 17 million are earmarked for tourism promotion (which is still a lot more than in the Balearics). It is an argument which, not for the first time, raises questions as to how tax revenues raised by the regions are then redistributed and used.
In Madrid, the PSM (Madrid socialist party) wants to introduce a tourist tax, one that has been spoken about for years but regularly rejected. The difference here though is that it would be a tax for a city, and there are plenty of examples of European cities which have such a tax. The Canaries' objections refer to the fact that tourist taxes are applied to cities and not tourist regions, but they then run up against one very important exception. Catalonia. Its tax is for the whole region and so includes tourist areas such as the Costa Brava as well as Barcelona.
Catalonia's experience of a tourist tax was always going to be one closely observed by other regions of Spain; it hasn't had any harmful impact. It is a tax that isn't too onerous (ninety cents a night is a typical rate) and that is limited in terms of the number of overnight stays: for a two-week holiday, for instance, it only applies to a maximum of seven nights. But Catalonia is not Mallorca and nor is it Tenerife. It clearly has hugely popular mass-tourism areas, but these don't generate quite the same media interest that Mallorca does. The old eco-tax was as much a PR disaster because of negative international media coverage as it was a disaster of discriminatory implementation. Any new tax would come in for the same treatment; the same hue and cry. Would it, therefore, be too great a risk?
It comes as no surprise that Podemos and Més should favour such a tax. PSOE is more of a surprise. I had previously doubted that PSOE would wish to revisit the crash scene of a tax it was responsible for introducing during its first administration (the pact of 1999-2003). The PSOE hierarchy might, when push comes to manifesto shove, take the view that it is too emotive an issue and too much of a risk, but Cosme Bonet, one of the party's electoral programme co-ordinators, appears to believe it is a risk worth taking in order that "tourism contributes to the conservation of the environment". He prefers to not refer to the tax as an eco one, but eco-tax is precisely what it would be.
Bonet has also said that it would be a tax with the consensus of the tourism sector. If he believes there will be consensus, he is probably deluding himself. The hoteliers, for one, will take a great deal of persuading. It was, after all, they who got the Matas Partido Popular administration from 2003 to abandon PSOE's unpopular tax. There again, the hoteliers had every reason to have been indignant with the old tax. It was they who shouldered the burden for its collection. One of the flaws of the eco-tax was that it was discriminatory; it was not applied to non-hotel accommodation.
This time, as far as the Més spokesperson David Abril is concerned, the hoteliers will not be singled out. The tax would be universal, and by that he means the inclusion of private holiday accommodation, currently not regulated, that Més would regulate. As PSOE has previously suggested that it would also seek regulation and as Podemos has intimated as much, a tax would apply more widely, just as it does in Catalonia, where private accommodation is properly registered and regulated. But this will hardly be a move to mollify the hoteliers or guarantee a consensus.
Tourist taxes are the flavour of the moment and not only among the Balearics left. In the Canaries, the Nueva Canarias party has presented a proposal for a tax to the regional parliament. Its purpose would be to raise additional funds for modernising outdated resorts and tourist services. The party reckons that 100 million euros could be raised. The hoteliers in the Canaries are dead against the idea. Among reasons for their objections is the Balearics eco-tax fiasco. Others include arguments that the sector is over-taxed as it is and that far too little of the revenue raised by the Canaries' tourism sector actually finds its way back into the system. This is a reasonable argument. The tourism sector generates tax revenues of over 1,500 million euros annually, yet, as an example, only 17 million are earmarked for tourism promotion (which is still a lot more than in the Balearics). It is an argument which, not for the first time, raises questions as to how tax revenues raised by the regions are then redistributed and used.
In Madrid, the PSM (Madrid socialist party) wants to introduce a tourist tax, one that has been spoken about for years but regularly rejected. The difference here though is that it would be a tax for a city, and there are plenty of examples of European cities which have such a tax. The Canaries' objections refer to the fact that tourist taxes are applied to cities and not tourist regions, but they then run up against one very important exception. Catalonia. Its tax is for the whole region and so includes tourist areas such as the Costa Brava as well as Barcelona.
Catalonia's experience of a tourist tax was always going to be one closely observed by other regions of Spain; it hasn't had any harmful impact. It is a tax that isn't too onerous (ninety cents a night is a typical rate) and that is limited in terms of the number of overnight stays: for a two-week holiday, for instance, it only applies to a maximum of seven nights. But Catalonia is not Mallorca and nor is it Tenerife. It clearly has hugely popular mass-tourism areas, but these don't generate quite the same media interest that Mallorca does. The old eco-tax was as much a PR disaster because of negative international media coverage as it was a disaster of discriminatory implementation. Any new tax would come in for the same treatment; the same hue and cry. Would it, therefore, be too great a risk?
Monday, February 23, 2015
There May Be Chaos Ahead
Last October, the results of an opinion poll of voting intentions for the regional elections this May led me to suggest that government in the Balearics could be plunged into chaos and that the islands could be ungovernable. A new poll, for "Ultima Hora", hasn't altered my opinion and nor has it given any clearer indication as to the make-up of possible coalitions; the poll establishes that there would have to be a coalition of some style, as no one party would have a majority.
Three months away from the elections, the Partido Popular has yet to show signs of sufficient enough support returning to enable it to retain its current parliamentary majority. Deprived of friends and allies among other parties, it will, on current polling evidence, be booted out of government. The assumption of a pact of leftist parties forming the next government holds good, but what might this pact look like?
On the basis of the higher estimates of numbers of parliamentary deputies, an amalgam of PSOE (plus its Formentera wing), Podemos and Més would have 33 seats, three more than the 30 needed to form a majority. Lower estimates make things messier, so in order to avoid over-complicating hypotheses, let's accept the higher ones. PSOE would have the most seats and a one per cent greater share of the vote than Podemos. Francina Armengol would become president with Podemos and Més her partners.
This is the neat and easy way of looking at the poll, but neat and easy may not be how things will be, and that is because of Podemos. Much has been said about Podemos being an unknown quantity, but this is the unknown of policy. There is another unknown. How would Podemos behave in government?
This is no idle question because even entering into a coalition presents Podemos with a philosophical difficulty. Essentially, it rejects all established political parties, but this rejection is all but absolute when it comes to the "casta", the two main parties - PSOE and the PP. A coalition with PSOE would run counter to one of its principal reasons for existing - which is to break the duopoly of what is seen as a corrupt two-party system. Getting into bed with PSOE could, probably will be construed as hypocritical, but what's the alternative? Does Podemos turn down advances to form a coalition? If it does, why is it bothering with putting up candidates? Moreover, were it to, it would fail those who vote for it. If it gains 12 or 13 seats, as the poll suggests, its democratic responsibility would require it to swallow its philosophy.
This said, we have already begun to see that Podemos can be chameleon-like and pragmatic. Its distaste for the casta would be put aside in order to have a place at the governmental table. But then what? Here is the real unknown because of how Podemos operates.
The extent of its participative democracy can be exaggerated, as it has its citizens' councils to make final decisions, but the principle of participation is a Podemos fundamental. Might it abandon it as it would also abandon its rejection of the casta? Possibly, but if not, then how, when it holds places in parliament and a cabinet, is government going to function? It is here, I would suggest, that lie the roots of potential chaos. The portents are already not that good when one considers resignations and differences that have cropped up in various Podemos councils. And there would also be, in effect, differing systems of decision-making for a coalition government - parliament, the cabinet and the Podemos participators. How are these reconciled? Can they be?
It is Més, I believe, who would hold the key to a coalition. Given the experience of some of its senior people, I could see it acting as a type of peacemaker, but for how long could such a coalition hold together? We might all be surprised, and a coalition might work perfectly well, but there has to be a fear that at some point it would collapse and so would the government.
So much for the left, what about the right? The higher estimate for the PP is 27 seats, three short of a majority. A pact with El Pi (that might amount to 30 seats) has been ruled out by El Pi's Jaume Font. If this is impossible then it will be impossible, as things stand, for the PP to carry on after May. But, there might yet be a twist. PP barons won't admit it, but if Bauzá is declared "imputado" by the judge's investigation into the granting of new pharmacies, these barons might well welcome this. Bauzá would have to stand aside. Someone else, Gabriel Company, the environment-agriculture minister, or Maria Salom, the president of the Council of Mallorca, would take over. Suddenly, clawing back those three seats might not seem impossible.
Three months away from the elections, the Partido Popular has yet to show signs of sufficient enough support returning to enable it to retain its current parliamentary majority. Deprived of friends and allies among other parties, it will, on current polling evidence, be booted out of government. The assumption of a pact of leftist parties forming the next government holds good, but what might this pact look like?
On the basis of the higher estimates of numbers of parliamentary deputies, an amalgam of PSOE (plus its Formentera wing), Podemos and Més would have 33 seats, three more than the 30 needed to form a majority. Lower estimates make things messier, so in order to avoid over-complicating hypotheses, let's accept the higher ones. PSOE would have the most seats and a one per cent greater share of the vote than Podemos. Francina Armengol would become president with Podemos and Més her partners.
This is the neat and easy way of looking at the poll, but neat and easy may not be how things will be, and that is because of Podemos. Much has been said about Podemos being an unknown quantity, but this is the unknown of policy. There is another unknown. How would Podemos behave in government?
This is no idle question because even entering into a coalition presents Podemos with a philosophical difficulty. Essentially, it rejects all established political parties, but this rejection is all but absolute when it comes to the "casta", the two main parties - PSOE and the PP. A coalition with PSOE would run counter to one of its principal reasons for existing - which is to break the duopoly of what is seen as a corrupt two-party system. Getting into bed with PSOE could, probably will be construed as hypocritical, but what's the alternative? Does Podemos turn down advances to form a coalition? If it does, why is it bothering with putting up candidates? Moreover, were it to, it would fail those who vote for it. If it gains 12 or 13 seats, as the poll suggests, its democratic responsibility would require it to swallow its philosophy.
This said, we have already begun to see that Podemos can be chameleon-like and pragmatic. Its distaste for the casta would be put aside in order to have a place at the governmental table. But then what? Here is the real unknown because of how Podemos operates.
The extent of its participative democracy can be exaggerated, as it has its citizens' councils to make final decisions, but the principle of participation is a Podemos fundamental. Might it abandon it as it would also abandon its rejection of the casta? Possibly, but if not, then how, when it holds places in parliament and a cabinet, is government going to function? It is here, I would suggest, that lie the roots of potential chaos. The portents are already not that good when one considers resignations and differences that have cropped up in various Podemos councils. And there would also be, in effect, differing systems of decision-making for a coalition government - parliament, the cabinet and the Podemos participators. How are these reconciled? Can they be?
It is Més, I believe, who would hold the key to a coalition. Given the experience of some of its senior people, I could see it acting as a type of peacemaker, but for how long could such a coalition hold together? We might all be surprised, and a coalition might work perfectly well, but there has to be a fear that at some point it would collapse and so would the government.
So much for the left, what about the right? The higher estimate for the PP is 27 seats, three short of a majority. A pact with El Pi (that might amount to 30 seats) has been ruled out by El Pi's Jaume Font. If this is impossible then it will be impossible, as things stand, for the PP to carry on after May. But, there might yet be a twist. PP barons won't admit it, but if Bauzá is declared "imputado" by the judge's investigation into the granting of new pharmacies, these barons might well welcome this. Bauzá would have to stand aside. Someone else, Gabriel Company, the environment-agriculture minister, or Maria Salom, the president of the Council of Mallorca, would take over. Suddenly, clawing back those three seats might not seem impossible.
Wednesday, November 19, 2014
Unhappy Together?: Mallorca's left
Biel Barceló is a name with which you should familiarise yourselves if you haven't already. He is secretary-general of the PSM, the Mallorcan socialist party which supports Mallorcan nationalism. He is the parliamentary spokesperson for Més, a grouping of the PSM, Entesa (basically the same thing as the PSM, but formed when there was a split in PSM ranks), the Iniciativa Verds (greens) and the ERC (Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya - Catalonian republican left).
Més is a relatively new grouping in that rather than being a coalition of different components it became a "single political project" in October last year under the leadership of Barceló. He is thus the strong man of the Balearics left-wing, the firmly left-wing as opposed to the qualified leftism of PSOE. He has been on the scene for a number of years. He knows his way around. He is the Més candidate to be president of the Balearics in 2015.
Barceló has spoken of the possibility of there being a government which is truly of the left for the first time in the Balearics. While PSOE has headed two coalition administrations, these were ones in which the old Unió Mallorquina (not left-wing) featured. The UM is now dead but partially resuscitated by a struggling regionalist-nationalist merger that is El Pi. Centrist Mallorcan nationalism, represented by El Pi, may be inconsequential at the spring elections next year. Barceló is thus correct in believing that there could well be a government only of the left.
He made his remarks at a public meeting with Laura Camargo, who is a leading member of Podemos in Mallorca. Camargo noted that though there had been talk of a "possible flirtation" between Més and Podemos, "no romance was envisaged at the moment". She was referring to the possibility that Podemos might join some grand pact of the left rather than go it alone at the regional elections. If there were to be such an amalgamation, then it is conceivable that it might just secure the highest percentage of the vote and so head a new government.
Even if there isn't such a pre-election pact, Podemos would surely form part of a left-wing coalition in government, headed by PSOE. In the absence of a grand pact between Més and Podemos, PSOE would certainly achieve a higher percentage of the vote and so be number one in government, with Francina Armengol as president. But whichever way it might play out, you have the ingredients for mightily difficult government.
Just consider Més for a moment. One of its components, Entesa, was born out of an ideological division within the PSM in 2006. It has since come back into the fold. A further component is the ERC. It was not part of the original "single political project" formed last year. Its inclusion within Més was approved in May this year. But now an almighty row has broken out because the ERC president, Joan Lladó, only managed to make eleventh position on the list of Més candidates for the regional parliament; the list headed by Barceló.
The ERC has called foul, to which Barceló has responded that the voting for candidates was transparent. It was a process, therefore, through which Lladó received comparatively little support. The ERC might now walk away from Més, and Barceló seems unconcerned were this to happen; the ERC on its own, according to the latest polls, might not manage to win a single seat in parliament.
Barceló has also spoken of the need for there to be "sovereignism" within Més, by which he means one ideology. But as had previously been demonstrated with Entesa, arriving at this one ideology is not straightforward, while the ERC row has simply reinforced the difficulty. Place this inside a coalition government with Podemos and as importantly PSOE, and you begin to see how such a coalition could be riven with conflict. The current Partido Popular administration may not be all sweetness, light and harmony, but a coalition of the left could be like a bar brawl of competing factions.
There again, it might not be. It might work perfectly well, but Armengol as president would face an enormous challenge to ensure that it does, and a key challenge she would have would be in the divvying-up of responsibilities. Which party would get education, health, environment, tourism? Barceló isn't totally accurate when he says that there would be a party of the left for the first time. There was under Antich when the UM was booted out of the coalition. What happened then was that the PSM got more power, i.e. at environment, and went around reversing decisions. Antich was rarely in total command of his government anyway, bowing to demands for, for instance, the absolutism of Catalan. Barceló might believe in sovereignism, but putting it into practice is quite a different matter.
Més is a relatively new grouping in that rather than being a coalition of different components it became a "single political project" in October last year under the leadership of Barceló. He is thus the strong man of the Balearics left-wing, the firmly left-wing as opposed to the qualified leftism of PSOE. He has been on the scene for a number of years. He knows his way around. He is the Més candidate to be president of the Balearics in 2015.
Barceló has spoken of the possibility of there being a government which is truly of the left for the first time in the Balearics. While PSOE has headed two coalition administrations, these were ones in which the old Unió Mallorquina (not left-wing) featured. The UM is now dead but partially resuscitated by a struggling regionalist-nationalist merger that is El Pi. Centrist Mallorcan nationalism, represented by El Pi, may be inconsequential at the spring elections next year. Barceló is thus correct in believing that there could well be a government only of the left.
He made his remarks at a public meeting with Laura Camargo, who is a leading member of Podemos in Mallorca. Camargo noted that though there had been talk of a "possible flirtation" between Més and Podemos, "no romance was envisaged at the moment". She was referring to the possibility that Podemos might join some grand pact of the left rather than go it alone at the regional elections. If there were to be such an amalgamation, then it is conceivable that it might just secure the highest percentage of the vote and so head a new government.
Even if there isn't such a pre-election pact, Podemos would surely form part of a left-wing coalition in government, headed by PSOE. In the absence of a grand pact between Més and Podemos, PSOE would certainly achieve a higher percentage of the vote and so be number one in government, with Francina Armengol as president. But whichever way it might play out, you have the ingredients for mightily difficult government.
Just consider Més for a moment. One of its components, Entesa, was born out of an ideological division within the PSM in 2006. It has since come back into the fold. A further component is the ERC. It was not part of the original "single political project" formed last year. Its inclusion within Més was approved in May this year. But now an almighty row has broken out because the ERC president, Joan Lladó, only managed to make eleventh position on the list of Més candidates for the regional parliament; the list headed by Barceló.
The ERC has called foul, to which Barceló has responded that the voting for candidates was transparent. It was a process, therefore, through which Lladó received comparatively little support. The ERC might now walk away from Més, and Barceló seems unconcerned were this to happen; the ERC on its own, according to the latest polls, might not manage to win a single seat in parliament.
Barceló has also spoken of the need for there to be "sovereignism" within Més, by which he means one ideology. But as had previously been demonstrated with Entesa, arriving at this one ideology is not straightforward, while the ERC row has simply reinforced the difficulty. Place this inside a coalition government with Podemos and as importantly PSOE, and you begin to see how such a coalition could be riven with conflict. The current Partido Popular administration may not be all sweetness, light and harmony, but a coalition of the left could be like a bar brawl of competing factions.
There again, it might not be. It might work perfectly well, but Armengol as president would face an enormous challenge to ensure that it does, and a key challenge she would have would be in the divvying-up of responsibilities. Which party would get education, health, environment, tourism? Barceló isn't totally accurate when he says that there would be a party of the left for the first time. There was under Antich when the UM was booted out of the coalition. What happened then was that the PSM got more power, i.e. at environment, and went around reversing decisions. Antich was rarely in total command of his government anyway, bowing to demands for, for instance, the absolutism of Catalan. Barceló might believe in sovereignism, but putting it into practice is quite a different matter.
Saturday, November 01, 2014
The Great Mallorcan Tax Giveaway
When all else fails - and it has - the political magician has one last trick which he hopes will win the gasps and applause of the electorate audience. Off comes the top hat and out pops the rabbit which fires a pop gun with the words tax cuts scrawled on a scruffy piece of paper dangling from the final lifeline shot by a failing administration. See the Great Bauzá! Be amazed by his wizardry! Be agog at his political-death-defying feats!
The Bauzá Magic Show has been a roaring success. He has sawn ex-finance minister Aguiló in half. Made former education man Rafael Bosch disappear. Turned Palma's Mateo Isern into a frog. Conjured up a teaching system of awe-inspiring failure. Subjected his own party to the thousand cuts of swords thrust into a box that once contained Balearic regionalist identity. Symbolically turned the Catalan flag into the red and yellow of Spanish nationhood. Yes, a fabulous success. Ah but, there is always the sleight of hand and the rabbit with the tax giveaway.
Anyone out there remember austerity? It was ushered in with grim-reaper solemnity by José Ramón. Dourness, parsimony, cuts of different sorts - to personnel, services, budgets - were for the people of the Balearics to have to suffer for four years. The long faces of crisis were to endure while the vandalised public finances, looted and battered by the previous lot, were slowly mended, nailed back together and given a fresh lick of whitewash. But suddenly, the long faces have been replaced by the happy, smiling features of José Ramón, clapping wildly at every PP mayoral selection decision and beaming his most maniacal of beams.
All that austerity, and do you know what? The current, austerity-driven Balearic Government will be spending over 350 million euros more than when it started. It has managed to add over 1,000 million euros of new debt. Pretty good going, huh? The budget for 2015 - 362 million euros higher than in the first year of government - will include items of expenditure such as increasing the amounts given to political parties, like the PP, which will have twice as much to spend on advertising next year, and giving more to the IB3 broadcaster, firmly under the control of the PP and firmly made to utter only words of Mallorquín and not Catalan.
This non-austere generosity can be explained by the "great effort" of the past three years to overcome the "grave situation" that Bauzá was confronted with. Yes, he truly has been a magician. And what's more, the people of the Balearics will be better off to the tune of 250 million euros of lower taxes next year. Though don't anyone get too carried away, as there is an apparent contradiction in this - 160 million euros more to be raised through income tax and IVA. But don't let's dwell on this. Bauzá certainly isn't. The 250 million euros giveaway is what will get the electorate clapping as wildly as he does.
There are, of course, elections coming up and so there is an explanation which differs to the "great effort" one. Taxes down, budgets up, let's spend lots of money and see those PP names filling the ballot boxes. Tax cuts by government and tax cuts by town halls, just a couple of which are Pollensa and Calvia. "Electioneering", cried the socialist opposition in Calvia, which was perfectly true, though there has also been the "great work of management" by the Manu administration, said one of the PP deputy mayors. And what cuts these are in Calvia. 60% off for "large discos" for instance. Who on earth has Calvia got in mind, do you suppose? Oh well, nothing like recognising the good works that will see the phoenix rise from the ashes of some rocks in Magalluf. And nothing like the wave of the magician's wand and the magician's tax-cut incantation. "Abracadabra!" And with that, all the PP woes were blown away in a puff of smoke.
The Bauzá Magic Show has been a roaring success. He has sawn ex-finance minister Aguiló in half. Made former education man Rafael Bosch disappear. Turned Palma's Mateo Isern into a frog. Conjured up a teaching system of awe-inspiring failure. Subjected his own party to the thousand cuts of swords thrust into a box that once contained Balearic regionalist identity. Symbolically turned the Catalan flag into the red and yellow of Spanish nationhood. Yes, a fabulous success. Ah but, there is always the sleight of hand and the rabbit with the tax giveaway.
Anyone out there remember austerity? It was ushered in with grim-reaper solemnity by José Ramón. Dourness, parsimony, cuts of different sorts - to personnel, services, budgets - were for the people of the Balearics to have to suffer for four years. The long faces of crisis were to endure while the vandalised public finances, looted and battered by the previous lot, were slowly mended, nailed back together and given a fresh lick of whitewash. But suddenly, the long faces have been replaced by the happy, smiling features of José Ramón, clapping wildly at every PP mayoral selection decision and beaming his most maniacal of beams.
All that austerity, and do you know what? The current, austerity-driven Balearic Government will be spending over 350 million euros more than when it started. It has managed to add over 1,000 million euros of new debt. Pretty good going, huh? The budget for 2015 - 362 million euros higher than in the first year of government - will include items of expenditure such as increasing the amounts given to political parties, like the PP, which will have twice as much to spend on advertising next year, and giving more to the IB3 broadcaster, firmly under the control of the PP and firmly made to utter only words of Mallorquín and not Catalan.
This non-austere generosity can be explained by the "great effort" of the past three years to overcome the "grave situation" that Bauzá was confronted with. Yes, he truly has been a magician. And what's more, the people of the Balearics will be better off to the tune of 250 million euros of lower taxes next year. Though don't anyone get too carried away, as there is an apparent contradiction in this - 160 million euros more to be raised through income tax and IVA. But don't let's dwell on this. Bauzá certainly isn't. The 250 million euros giveaway is what will get the electorate clapping as wildly as he does.
There are, of course, elections coming up and so there is an explanation which differs to the "great effort" one. Taxes down, budgets up, let's spend lots of money and see those PP names filling the ballot boxes. Tax cuts by government and tax cuts by town halls, just a couple of which are Pollensa and Calvia. "Electioneering", cried the socialist opposition in Calvia, which was perfectly true, though there has also been the "great work of management" by the Manu administration, said one of the PP deputy mayors. And what cuts these are in Calvia. 60% off for "large discos" for instance. Who on earth has Calvia got in mind, do you suppose? Oh well, nothing like recognising the good works that will see the phoenix rise from the ashes of some rocks in Magalluf. And nothing like the wave of the magician's wand and the magician's tax-cut incantation. "Abracadabra!" And with that, all the PP woes were blown away in a puff of smoke.
Monday, June 30, 2014
There May Be Chaos Ahead: Opinion poll
There is a great deal of water to yet pass under the bridge before next spring's regional elections, but if the polls are to be believed, the late-summer and winter storms will flood political torrents that pour under "puentes" of Mallorca, wash away the stagnant and accumulated detritus, cleanse and purify them with a collective can-do but also leave a mud so deep that some are stuck or sink. The poll just conducted by the Balearics Institute of Social Studies on behalf of "Ultima Hora" will mean José Ramón Bauzá and the PP thrashing around in quicksand, desperately grabbing at any passing safety rope in an attempt to haul themselves out of a political mire, while Francina Armengol and PSOE struggle up to the neck in fear that they will be consumed by the mucky waters of time and disappear from view. Glug. Glug.
This is what the poll suggests how the Balearics parliament would look after the next election: the PP, 27 seats, down eight; PSOE, 14 seats, down four; the Més leftist, nationalist, greenist group with six seats, up one; and in fourth spot, up five from zero, would be Podemos. Yes we can. With the remaining seven seats distributed between the United Left, El Pi, the UPyD and one for the Formentera wing of PSOE, the picture which would emerge, were this poll to be replicated at the elections, would be one of such potential chaos that the Balearics might be all but ungovernable.
The maths are such that a coalition would have to be formed in order to get a minimum of thirty seats and thus form a majority. For the PP, it might seem that it could derive support from the centrist UPyD and the regio-nationalist-conservative El Pi. They could bump the number up to thirty, but though certain aspects of their political philosophies might coincide, they are wide apart in other regards. The UpyD, a relatively new party, wants to be an alternative to the two-party system. How could it sell out that idea and join with the PP? Jaume Font, the leader of El Pi, is said to have mended bridges with Bauzá but then there is Antoni Pastor, who most certainly has not. El Pi, in any event, totally rejects Bauzá language policy and attitude towards regionalism.
If the PP were unable to gather partners around it, then what of a PSOE-led coalition? Well, it's possible but would require the support of virtually all the other parties including, and most significantly, Podemos. It, rather like the UPyD but totally unlike it in character, wants to break the two-party system. The idea of it ever forming part of a coalition of which PSOE were a part seems almost inconceivable. But then Podemos hasn't as yet in its very brief existence been confronted with "realpolitik", one which strikes at its very purpose. If it has ambitions of being a legitimate political force, then it is going to have to compromise. Even if it does or it doesn't, one feels that its success at the European elections merely sowed the seeds of its own destruction.
For PSOE the outlook is bleak. The confirmation of Francina Armengol as leader has done nothing to improve its prospects, and there was never any good reason to believe that her victory would improve them. Armengol was president of the Council of Mallorca under the last PSOE-led administration. People don't forget. Or rather, they would prefer to forget those who are discredited or representative of previous failure. Armengol offers nothing new, but PSOE badly needs to be seen as renewed.
The PP, which has been disintegrating into fragments of pro- and anti-Catalan and pro- and anti-regionalism, could yet retrieve the situation. There will be those in the party who know or think they know how this could be done. Would there be a coup to oust Bauzá? Even if there were, who would take over? The party might just be so damaged that it can't retrieve the situation whoever leads it. Not next year anyway.
All this leaves one other option, assuming a grand coalition between the PP and PSOE would be a total non-starter, and this is that a majority coalition cannot be formed by either side. It has not been untypical for a major party to fail to get a majority, but in these instances there has been sufficient support to create a majority through coalition. The possibility exists, however, that even this might not be achievable next year. Town halls in Mallorca can and do operate with minority administrations, but could a government? It has happened, but only because the Unió Mallorquina was thrown out of the PSOE 2007-2011 pact in the final year of that administration.
Things can change between now and next spring, but if they don't, then the Balearics could end up without a government.
Index for June 2014
Abdication of KIng Juan Carlos - 3 June 2014, 7 June 2014
Archaeology tourism route - 25 June 2014
Balearics' education conflict - 23 June 2014
Bellevue and tourist treatment - 4 June 2014
Biniali and traditional games - 1 June 2014
Brochures - 20 June 2014
Civil War: exhumation of bodies - 17 June 2014
Compatibility: President Bauzá - 15 June 2014
Flying car ferries - 10 June 2014
Gaming law in Balearics - 24 June 2014
Hoteliers federation falling out - 2 June 2014
Jaume Sastre and President Bauzá - 16 June 2014
King Felipe - 21 June 2014
La Gola, Puerto Pollensa - 13 June 2014
Magalluf not like northern resorts - 6 June 2014
Mallorca Song Festival - 14 June 2014
Miquel dels Sants Oliver - 18 June 2014
Pere Capellà - 19 June 2014
Princess Cristina and Judge Castro - 29 June 2014
Regional election opinion poll - 30 June 2014
Roads, buses and Mallorca's history - 9 June 2014
Sant Joan and midsummer - 22 June 2014
Selva "herbes" fair - 8 June 2014
Shipping history in Mallorca - 11 June 2014
Spanish students on Mallorcan holidays - 26 June 2014, 27 June 2014
Surfing - 5 June 2014
Tourism strategy in Mallorca - 28 June 2014
World Cup - 12 June 2014
This is what the poll suggests how the Balearics parliament would look after the next election: the PP, 27 seats, down eight; PSOE, 14 seats, down four; the Més leftist, nationalist, greenist group with six seats, up one; and in fourth spot, up five from zero, would be Podemos. Yes we can. With the remaining seven seats distributed between the United Left, El Pi, the UPyD and one for the Formentera wing of PSOE, the picture which would emerge, were this poll to be replicated at the elections, would be one of such potential chaos that the Balearics might be all but ungovernable.
The maths are such that a coalition would have to be formed in order to get a minimum of thirty seats and thus form a majority. For the PP, it might seem that it could derive support from the centrist UPyD and the regio-nationalist-conservative El Pi. They could bump the number up to thirty, but though certain aspects of their political philosophies might coincide, they are wide apart in other regards. The UpyD, a relatively new party, wants to be an alternative to the two-party system. How could it sell out that idea and join with the PP? Jaume Font, the leader of El Pi, is said to have mended bridges with Bauzá but then there is Antoni Pastor, who most certainly has not. El Pi, in any event, totally rejects Bauzá language policy and attitude towards regionalism.
If the PP were unable to gather partners around it, then what of a PSOE-led coalition? Well, it's possible but would require the support of virtually all the other parties including, and most significantly, Podemos. It, rather like the UPyD but totally unlike it in character, wants to break the two-party system. The idea of it ever forming part of a coalition of which PSOE were a part seems almost inconceivable. But then Podemos hasn't as yet in its very brief existence been confronted with "realpolitik", one which strikes at its very purpose. If it has ambitions of being a legitimate political force, then it is going to have to compromise. Even if it does or it doesn't, one feels that its success at the European elections merely sowed the seeds of its own destruction.
For PSOE the outlook is bleak. The confirmation of Francina Armengol as leader has done nothing to improve its prospects, and there was never any good reason to believe that her victory would improve them. Armengol was president of the Council of Mallorca under the last PSOE-led administration. People don't forget. Or rather, they would prefer to forget those who are discredited or representative of previous failure. Armengol offers nothing new, but PSOE badly needs to be seen as renewed.
The PP, which has been disintegrating into fragments of pro- and anti-Catalan and pro- and anti-regionalism, could yet retrieve the situation. There will be those in the party who know or think they know how this could be done. Would there be a coup to oust Bauzá? Even if there were, who would take over? The party might just be so damaged that it can't retrieve the situation whoever leads it. Not next year anyway.
All this leaves one other option, assuming a grand coalition between the PP and PSOE would be a total non-starter, and this is that a majority coalition cannot be formed by either side. It has not been untypical for a major party to fail to get a majority, but in these instances there has been sufficient support to create a majority through coalition. The possibility exists, however, that even this might not be achievable next year. Town halls in Mallorca can and do operate with minority administrations, but could a government? It has happened, but only because the Unió Mallorquina was thrown out of the PSOE 2007-2011 pact in the final year of that administration.
Things can change between now and next spring, but if they don't, then the Balearics could end up without a government.
Index for June 2014
Abdication of KIng Juan Carlos - 3 June 2014, 7 June 2014
Archaeology tourism route - 25 June 2014
Balearics' education conflict - 23 June 2014
Bellevue and tourist treatment - 4 June 2014
Biniali and traditional games - 1 June 2014
Brochures - 20 June 2014
Civil War: exhumation of bodies - 17 June 2014
Compatibility: President Bauzá - 15 June 2014
Flying car ferries - 10 June 2014
Gaming law in Balearics - 24 June 2014
Hoteliers federation falling out - 2 June 2014
Jaume Sastre and President Bauzá - 16 June 2014
King Felipe - 21 June 2014
La Gola, Puerto Pollensa - 13 June 2014
Magalluf not like northern resorts - 6 June 2014
Mallorca Song Festival - 14 June 2014
Miquel dels Sants Oliver - 18 June 2014
Pere Capellà - 19 June 2014
Princess Cristina and Judge Castro - 29 June 2014
Regional election opinion poll - 30 June 2014
Roads, buses and Mallorca's history - 9 June 2014
Sant Joan and midsummer - 22 June 2014
Selva "herbes" fair - 8 June 2014
Shipping history in Mallorca - 11 June 2014
Spanish students on Mallorcan holidays - 26 June 2014, 27 June 2014
Surfing - 5 June 2014
Tourism strategy in Mallorca - 28 June 2014
World Cup - 12 June 2014
Tuesday, April 08, 2014
President Armengol?: PSOE's primaries
It was a vote that was not without curiosity. Grandly entitled the "primaries", the process leading up to the election bore no resemblance to rather better-known primaries across the Atlantic. There were no cheerleaders, no families dragged onto stages to beam admiringly at wives or daughters or mothers, no small fortunes spent. Between them the two candidates forked out a miserly four grand. Primaries-lite, the "big debate" took place in the middle-Mallorca backwater of Lloseta, which rhymes with Rosetta. No stone was revealed, though, bearing a decree to establish the divine cult of the new ruler, whichever it was to be. Neither Francina nor Aina can aspire to cult status, though each may, in their contrasting ways, be divine.
Aina, the more glamorous of the two, had placed hope in the support from her Palma bailiwick. She duly received it, as territorialism decreed that the tribes of the Balearics offered tribute to their own. But it worked the other way, too. Francina of Inca could command the loyalty of her home leather town. The Kingdom of Cusco, with she as its queen, was hers, aided by more of that whipping and the tanning of Inca's hides as they were corralled into the Armengol booth.
Mysteriously, the vote was less predictable in the forgotten islands. Were it down to Menorca, then Calvo would have been made queen on the day. The vote there was almost the reverse of the overall result. In Ibiza, Francina gained over twice as many votes as Aina.
Whatever hard-to-explain variance there was in the voting, both candidates needed the support of their "home" territories and to appeal to a broader electorate than had previously been the case. Both "militantes" and "simpatizantes" were eligible to place their cross against the names. The former are the active, paying members. The latter are supporters. Which has begged a question as to how a supporter is defined. Is the actual election - against other political parties - not the occasion when supporters should demonstrate their support? Can one be certain of credentials? In Barcelona, a similar exercise involving supporters has led to numerous complaints.
The combination of members and supporters meant that 14,572 people could express a preference. Perhaps it is surprising that PSOE in the Balearics can count on only 2,587 paying members. Or maybe it isn't surprising.
Tribal and territorial factors aside, what were the 14,000 plus voting for? The differences between Aina and Francina were small. They were largely ones of style rather than substance. Now that the vote has been taken and the winner declared, though, whatever minor differences might have existed will be buried. "We must work together," said Francina to Aina. Together they are stronger. Together they are a real alternative to the right. Together they can rid the Balearics of Bauzá. Get thee behind us, thou robber of Balearics citizens. Francina didn't quite say this, but she did suggest that José Ramón had been doing some robbing. Which was rather unkind of her.
There is a very real possibility that the Balearics will have a female president. Decline in support for the Partido Popular suggests that though the PP will most likely win the election next year, its margin would be insufficient to form a majority. This occurred in 2007. The PP got 47% of the vote, but its 28 seats (five more than PSOE's) were not enough to prevent a PSOE coalition forming the regional government. PSOE with the backing of the Més grouping might just be able to oust the PP next time round. It is too early to predict, though.
Issues that are likely to crop up during proceedings in 2015 are the scale of public administration and trilingual teaching. Armengol would be most unlikely to follow the Bauzá line on cutting back levels of government, such as the Council of Mallorca. She was once its president, after all, and enjoyed spending its money. On TIL Armengol has said that she would dump it. Més would certainly hold her to that. Calvo had implied that she would keep it. Here is one difference, and it invites a question as to whether they could work together or whether, like Delgado was to some extent with Bauzá, Aina might prove to be the elephant in Francina's room: an altogether more glamorous one than Delgado and also, despite her defeat, a very much more popular alternative to the leader than Delgado was.
* Photo of Francina Armengol from http://www.psoe.es
Tuesday, March 27, 2012
Where Winning Means Losing: Andalucía's election
Just one of the quirks of Spanish politics is that not all elections take place at the same time. It has been the quirk surrounding Andalucía that has, it has been widely suggested, held the national government back from going really hard at attempting to right Spain's economy. The Partido Popular, in control of the national government and of most regional governments, had been looking for a ringing endorsement in Andalucía. It hasn't happened.
There has been an endorsement of sorts in that the PP has, for the first time ever, actually won the election for the Andalucían parliament, but it hasn't gained a majority. It could form the government, but it would need support from the left, and the left, in the form of PSOE and the United Left party, could well maintain Andalucía's socialist tradition by governing in coalition.
Andalucía's parliamentary elections would have coincided with the Spanish general election, had it not been for the fact that the general election was called five months early. The four-year electoral cycle for Andalucía's parliament is out of sync in any event, as regional parliaments were otherwise all elected in May last year.
It would have been better for everyone had Andalucía gone to the polls at the same time as the general election. The hiatus since then has seemingly held up Mariano Rajoy and it has also given time for disenchantment with Rajoy's PP national government to kick in; this is an interpretation of the Andalucían result, though the PP did still, after all, actually win the election.
Does the result and the potential continuance of a socialist government in Andalucía really make much difference? The PP controls mostly all of Spain and where it doesn't, such as in Catalonia, the government there, despite its differences with the national government in matters of a Catalan nature, is pretty much in agreement with the austerity measures.
In theory, it doesn't make a difference. But in practice, notwithstanding the PP's moral victory if it is indeed unable to form a government in Andalucía, it might just make a difference. The timing of the election and the result, five days before the general strike takes place, might well add fuel to the discontent on the streets, a discontent, so it is being said, that PSOE has been helping to stoke up.
Andalucía is not representative of Spain in that it has been solidly socialist ever since autonomous regional governments were introduced. It is also not representative in that it has the worst rate of unemployment in Spain and the second-worst GDP, one that is well below the average for Spanish regions. Nevertheless, if it stays outside the PP orbit, it could well become the focus for opposition to the national government, and opposition that might just turn a bit nasty, if some fears being voiced were to be realised.
There again, things turning nasty don't depend on election results. Too much can possibly be read into what has happened in Andalucía, but PSOE are milking the result for all it's worth, buoyed also by having gained most seats in another parliamentary election - in Asturias. Here, the election was on account of the government having been unworkable, the former PP secretary-general Francisco Álvarez Cascos having formed his own party and having been unable to establish a stable government following elections in May 2011. Cascos' party may well, with PP support, form the next government, but PSOE's numerical victory is being seen, if only by PSOE, as further evidence of disenchantment with the PP.
All of this political uncertainty takes place against the background of Italian premier Mario Monti having criticised Spain for not doing more to put its public accounts in order. This may sound like the pot calling the kettle black, but then Monti has taken significant measures to put the lid on the Italian deficit pot. Brussels might well agree with Monti, concern having been expressed that Rajoy's government has deliberately overstated the Spanish deficit (so as to make it look good) but implying that not all is as transparent as it might be in Madrid.
Brussels might also be concerned that Andalucía, a recipient of huge amounts of European benevolence about which many questions have been asked as to where it all went, is not about to shed a reputation for dodgy public governance and also acquire a further one as the region that undermines Rajoy's attempts to put Spain back on track. This assumes, however, that Rajoy is doing so. The Andalucía election may have been less than a ringing endorsement of the Rajoy government, but what actually has it been doing? Very little, other than anticipating this week's general strike.
Any comments to andrew@thealcudiaguide.com please.
There has been an endorsement of sorts in that the PP has, for the first time ever, actually won the election for the Andalucían parliament, but it hasn't gained a majority. It could form the government, but it would need support from the left, and the left, in the form of PSOE and the United Left party, could well maintain Andalucía's socialist tradition by governing in coalition.
Andalucía's parliamentary elections would have coincided with the Spanish general election, had it not been for the fact that the general election was called five months early. The four-year electoral cycle for Andalucía's parliament is out of sync in any event, as regional parliaments were otherwise all elected in May last year.
It would have been better for everyone had Andalucía gone to the polls at the same time as the general election. The hiatus since then has seemingly held up Mariano Rajoy and it has also given time for disenchantment with Rajoy's PP national government to kick in; this is an interpretation of the Andalucían result, though the PP did still, after all, actually win the election.
Does the result and the potential continuance of a socialist government in Andalucía really make much difference? The PP controls mostly all of Spain and where it doesn't, such as in Catalonia, the government there, despite its differences with the national government in matters of a Catalan nature, is pretty much in agreement with the austerity measures.
In theory, it doesn't make a difference. But in practice, notwithstanding the PP's moral victory if it is indeed unable to form a government in Andalucía, it might just make a difference. The timing of the election and the result, five days before the general strike takes place, might well add fuel to the discontent on the streets, a discontent, so it is being said, that PSOE has been helping to stoke up.
Andalucía is not representative of Spain in that it has been solidly socialist ever since autonomous regional governments were introduced. It is also not representative in that it has the worst rate of unemployment in Spain and the second-worst GDP, one that is well below the average for Spanish regions. Nevertheless, if it stays outside the PP orbit, it could well become the focus for opposition to the national government, and opposition that might just turn a bit nasty, if some fears being voiced were to be realised.
There again, things turning nasty don't depend on election results. Too much can possibly be read into what has happened in Andalucía, but PSOE are milking the result for all it's worth, buoyed also by having gained most seats in another parliamentary election - in Asturias. Here, the election was on account of the government having been unworkable, the former PP secretary-general Francisco Álvarez Cascos having formed his own party and having been unable to establish a stable government following elections in May 2011. Cascos' party may well, with PP support, form the next government, but PSOE's numerical victory is being seen, if only by PSOE, as further evidence of disenchantment with the PP.
All of this political uncertainty takes place against the background of Italian premier Mario Monti having criticised Spain for not doing more to put its public accounts in order. This may sound like the pot calling the kettle black, but then Monti has taken significant measures to put the lid on the Italian deficit pot. Brussels might well agree with Monti, concern having been expressed that Rajoy's government has deliberately overstated the Spanish deficit (so as to make it look good) but implying that not all is as transparent as it might be in Madrid.
Brussels might also be concerned that Andalucía, a recipient of huge amounts of European benevolence about which many questions have been asked as to where it all went, is not about to shed a reputation for dodgy public governance and also acquire a further one as the region that undermines Rajoy's attempts to put Spain back on track. This assumes, however, that Rajoy is doing so. The Andalucía election may have been less than a ringing endorsement of the Rajoy government, but what actually has it been doing? Very little, other than anticipating this week's general strike.
Any comments to andrew@thealcudiaguide.com please.
Monday, March 26, 2012
MALLORCA TODAY - PP wins in Andalucía but without majority
The anticipated victory of the Partido Popular in the regional elections in Andalucía has given the party 50 seats out of 109 in the regional parliament, not enough for a majority. The PP has won an Andalucían election for the first time, but may find itself having to form a pact with PSOE. In Asturias, PSOE has gained most seats (16 of 45) but the PP may well form a government in coalition with the Foro Asturias.
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