In a study of the municipality of Calvia at the turn of the millennium, it was shown that of residents with mainland Spanish origins, 42% of them were from Andalusia. The city of Granada had itself provided 17% of this Spanish group; 6.5% of the entire municipal population.
There may well be more up-to-date numbers, but I'm guessing that they won't have changed markedly. Otherwise, have social attitudes moved on over the intervening years? The question is asked because the author of the study, Miguel Ángel Miranda González, pointed towards social issues caused by immigration into Calvia. The tourism boom and the urban developments of the 1960s fostered the migration. The original Mallorcan population was and is comparatively tiny because of inward migration, and not just that from Andalusia.
Miranda observed in his study that the Mallorcan people as a whole, and so not only Calvia, have been unable to integrate waves of immigrants into their social structures. As a consequence, these groups maintain their interests distinct to those of the Mallorcan people. The observation is interesting if only because it offers a different take on the normal integration debate. Immigrants struggle to integrate because the means of doing so are unavailable.
I would suggest that this has changed to some degree. Calvia of course has institutionalised "foreigners" at town hall level. Other municipalities, if not having gone as far as Calvia, now have councillors with responsibilities for foreigners, and by foreigners, one means anyone not from Mallorca (including perhaps people from the rest of the Balearics).
The Andalusians were foreigners. Nowadays, and perhaps also as a mark of greater integration and acceptance, there are various Andalusian associations. Different town halls have welcomed their active participation in colouring the local cultural mix. The Feria de Abril* is the best example of this. Palma's is now in its 27th edition. Other municipalities also have an April fair, based - more or less - on the traditions of Seville.
They came because of tourism and construction. The association with tourism is still very evident. Many mainland seasonal workers come from Andalusia, and they've been doing so for years. They are re-engaged by employers who find in them a reliability and appetite for work that belie a long-held image: the lazy ones from the south (of Spain).
The emigration had started, though, before the great boom of the 1960s. Andalusians did not initially arrive in Mallorca in great number, although the Balearics was to become one of the main regions for Andalusian migration. They went mostly to Catalonia. In 1949, a newspaper referred to "authentic troglodytes", people from "underground settlements" in provinces such as Jaén and Granada. They were looked upon with suspicion by the authorities and by workers: employers could get away with paying them less. The authorities were to take action. Some 15,000 Andalusian immigrants were expelled from Catalonia between 1952 and 1957.
But still they came, the so-called "trains of hope" carrying them from a region which, for all the wealth of its great cities and of its own tourism, was historically poor and grindingly so. In certain respects it still is: Andalusia receives the biggest handout of state funding through the system that in the Balearics is considered to be so iniquitous (for the Balearics). In 1930 there were 70,000 Andalusians in Catalonia. The great migration, and it was enormous, increased this number to 840,000 by 1970.
Andalusia is curious because of its politics. It is the only region of Spain to have had an unbroken socialist government since the establishment of the regional democratic communities. That socialism, one has to assume, is a reflection of enduring difficulties in one of the country's poorer parts. The politics of Andalusia played a significant role in creating the regional communities and autonomous governments. The drafters of the 1978 Constitution originally intended to establish autonomy for Catalonia and the Basque Country. It was the Andalusians who led the objections. All regions were to gain this autonomy.
But what was it that made the Andalusians fight for this autonomy. Partly it was a sense of Andalusia's own unique circumstances and history, but just as important was the deep-rooted animosity that has existed and still does between Andalusia and Catalonia. The aspirations of an independent Catalonia encounter no greater opposition than in Andalusia. Catalonia, it has been suggested in Seville circles, wishes to create an apartheid for Spain.
The one-time president of Catalonia, Jordi Pujol, once wrote that the Andalusian is not consistent, he is anarchic and he is harmful. This can be taken as an indication of a xenophobia said to reside within Catalan attitudes. It is also an indication of the fact that Catalonia, more than the Balearics, objects to the financing system. And there is also that historical migration. The trains of hope which led to Barcelona and to the ports and so to Calvia.
* Palma's Feria de Abril concludes tomorrow, while Cala d'Or's runs from today until Sunday.
Showing posts with label Andalusia. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Andalusia. Show all posts
Friday, May 05, 2017
Wednesday, October 19, 2016
Andalusia's Gambit: Investiture Or Not
Andalusia. A region apart but a region very much a part. Where would Spain have been without Andalusia? Arguments can rage about the origins of flamenco - and they do - but it is Andalusia which takes the honour. The vibrancy of the dance and music helped to make Spain. In the eyes of the world, it was Andalusia which captured the essence of the new tourism. The Costa del Sol, curiously enough, wasn't a focus for the first wave, but Andalusia had exported its vivaciousness, its difference, and it changed Spain forever.
Andalusia may be on the point of changing Spain again. Or is it that it will put it back together? The most that Andalusia might do is reshape Spain's politics. That mould has already been undergoing manipulation, being twisted and distorted by new hands ready to render the old hands redundant. There is further manufacture afoot or in hand. This is breaking the mould of PSOE. Or is it that the mould returns to its original factory settings, not those of times long ago but of times more recent. These were contented times before the new hands started making light work of the outmoded shape PSOE had contorted itself into in peculiar antagonistic alliance with the Partido Popular.
This coming Sunday may well prove to be a defining moment. PSOE's federal committee will meet. It has a choice. It can agree to facilitate the investiture of Mariano Rajoy as prime minister or it can say no to Rajoy. Which way will it go? Andalusia will be all important in the decision.
Andalusia is apart because it is the only region in Spain to have been socialist since democratic regional governments were established. Here is one aspect of its difference, a seemingly curious one, for this is a region of great culture and great cities, apparently overwhelmed by richness to match the richness of that culture. Yet it is comparatively poor. Where would Andalusia be without Spain? It does well from the regional financing system. Very well.
It has a legacy. This is the region where liberalism was born, where the Cadiz Constitution envisaged a new Spain, a more egalitarian Spain, where the fight against Bonaparte was fostered, and where there was the consequent fight against the treacherous Ferdinand VII, who destroyed that movement and condemned Spain to decades of self-destruction. The omens may not sound good.
The new liberalism is one cloaked with conservatism. Andalusia, the nation's power base for PSOE, will decide. The broker of the power is its president, Susana Díaz. Her number two, Juan Cornejo, might just have uttered a statement that will pass into common use as an aphorism. "To govern is as important as leading an opposition." It can be taken to have a double meaning, but the intent is clear. The task of governing will fall to Mariano Rajoy. The opposition, the PSOE opposition, will be empowered by this. It can facilitate investiture, but it holds the power to influence policy. It hopes. Unless it falls apart, shattered by a region apart.
Díaz and Andalusia are determined that their vision and version of PSOE continues. It is the conservative version, the cosily close to the PP version, one in the name of the nation that it (Andalusia) did so much to bring to the world's attention. The nation is important to Andalusia. Apart but a part, it needs the unity of the nation, not least the greater riches in relative terms that exist elsewhere: Catalonia, the Balearics, for instance.
PSOE in Catalonia, via its first secretary Miquel Iceta, has said that a third election would be preferable to Rajoy. He doesn't, though, see that facilitating Rajoy's investiture will rupture the party and force it apart. The Balearics' Francina Armengol, trapped by the government of her making, thinks otherwise: possibly, or even probably. Tensions could erupt into revolution on Sunday.
Andalusia and its compatriots elsewhere, such as the "managing" leader Javier Fernández of Asturias, have a cunning plan. They will allow the investiture, but it will be support-lite. Eleven deputies in Congress will be put up as the sacrificial lambs. Rajoy would therefore stagger over the finishing-line, ten months after the race started. Who could have ever thought that they might hatch such a plan? Far be it from me, but it was me. I suggested several weeks ago that Pedro Sánchez could have done just that.
But whichever way Sánchez had chosen - and it now seems as if he backed the loser - it was wrong. Or right. He was caught in the vice of his party's enfeeblement. Andalusia, if it indeed plays its eleven-hand gambit, will trust that this will be reversed by the empowerment of highly scrutinising opposition. It will trust and it will hope, but might the consequence be that there is more which is apart? PSOE itself, and never forget Catalonia.
Andalusia may be on the point of changing Spain again. Or is it that it will put it back together? The most that Andalusia might do is reshape Spain's politics. That mould has already been undergoing manipulation, being twisted and distorted by new hands ready to render the old hands redundant. There is further manufacture afoot or in hand. This is breaking the mould of PSOE. Or is it that the mould returns to its original factory settings, not those of times long ago but of times more recent. These were contented times before the new hands started making light work of the outmoded shape PSOE had contorted itself into in peculiar antagonistic alliance with the Partido Popular.
This coming Sunday may well prove to be a defining moment. PSOE's federal committee will meet. It has a choice. It can agree to facilitate the investiture of Mariano Rajoy as prime minister or it can say no to Rajoy. Which way will it go? Andalusia will be all important in the decision.
Andalusia is apart because it is the only region in Spain to have been socialist since democratic regional governments were established. Here is one aspect of its difference, a seemingly curious one, for this is a region of great culture and great cities, apparently overwhelmed by richness to match the richness of that culture. Yet it is comparatively poor. Where would Andalusia be without Spain? It does well from the regional financing system. Very well.
It has a legacy. This is the region where liberalism was born, where the Cadiz Constitution envisaged a new Spain, a more egalitarian Spain, where the fight against Bonaparte was fostered, and where there was the consequent fight against the treacherous Ferdinand VII, who destroyed that movement and condemned Spain to decades of self-destruction. The omens may not sound good.
The new liberalism is one cloaked with conservatism. Andalusia, the nation's power base for PSOE, will decide. The broker of the power is its president, Susana Díaz. Her number two, Juan Cornejo, might just have uttered a statement that will pass into common use as an aphorism. "To govern is as important as leading an opposition." It can be taken to have a double meaning, but the intent is clear. The task of governing will fall to Mariano Rajoy. The opposition, the PSOE opposition, will be empowered by this. It can facilitate investiture, but it holds the power to influence policy. It hopes. Unless it falls apart, shattered by a region apart.
Díaz and Andalusia are determined that their vision and version of PSOE continues. It is the conservative version, the cosily close to the PP version, one in the name of the nation that it (Andalusia) did so much to bring to the world's attention. The nation is important to Andalusia. Apart but a part, it needs the unity of the nation, not least the greater riches in relative terms that exist elsewhere: Catalonia, the Balearics, for instance.
PSOE in Catalonia, via its first secretary Miquel Iceta, has said that a third election would be preferable to Rajoy. He doesn't, though, see that facilitating Rajoy's investiture will rupture the party and force it apart. The Balearics' Francina Armengol, trapped by the government of her making, thinks otherwise: possibly, or even probably. Tensions could erupt into revolution on Sunday.
Andalusia and its compatriots elsewhere, such as the "managing" leader Javier Fernández of Asturias, have a cunning plan. They will allow the investiture, but it will be support-lite. Eleven deputies in Congress will be put up as the sacrificial lambs. Rajoy would therefore stagger over the finishing-line, ten months after the race started. Who could have ever thought that they might hatch such a plan? Far be it from me, but it was me. I suggested several weeks ago that Pedro Sánchez could have done just that.
But whichever way Sánchez had chosen - and it now seems as if he backed the loser - it was wrong. Or right. He was caught in the vice of his party's enfeeblement. Andalusia, if it indeed plays its eleven-hand gambit, will trust that this will be reversed by the empowerment of highly scrutinising opposition. It will trust and it will hope, but might the consequence be that there is more which is apart? PSOE itself, and never forget Catalonia.
Monday, May 11, 2015
Lessons From Andalusia
On 22 March, Andalusia held its regional election. It had been caller because of a breakdown in the coalition government led by Susana Díaz of PSOE. The election returned PSOE as the most voted for party, with the same number of seats that it had obtained at the previous election, and while most post-electon analysis concentrated on the relative polling of different parties and what this might mean for elections elsewhere, such as here in the Balearics in under two weeks time, there was another aspect which may well have greater relevance to the Balearics. Although PSOE "won" the election, it failed to gain a majority, just as it had at the previous election. But unlike at that election, in March there was no obvious coalition candidate to come to PSOE's aid, and there still isn't. Consequently, Díaz said that she would govern with a minority. However, it isn't quite as simple as this (if forming a minority government can be described as simple). There is the matter of what other deputies in parliament think, and on Friday, they offered their thoughts. En bloc they voted against her investiture as president: in effect, Andalusia is currently without a government.
The parliament will hold another vote on Thursday. There may well be further votes but if, by the middle of July, Diáz has still not received support (or abstentions) that will enable her investiture, a new election will have to be called: those are the rules. Both Podemos and Ciudadanos have indicated a willingness to consider a pact - and the number of seats each has would be sufficient to create a majority - but there are strings attached. A fundamental principle of these two parties is their anti-corruption stance, and both have made it clear that a condition would be the removal of a former president, Manuel Chaves, from the national Congress of Deputies: he, as with Díaz's predecessor, is implicated in the enormous ERE (redundancy) scandal in Andalusia.
As things stand, Chaves will be on his way out after the Spanish general election in any event. Getting him to stand down now would, though, be symbolic: an act of commitment by PSOE to make a stand against corruption, alleged or otherwise. As this hasn't happened, neither Podemos nor Ciudadanos (C's) can accept entering into a coalition with Díaz.
The Chaves affair is just one way in which what is happening in Andalusia is similar to the Balearics. Here, the likelihood is that President Bauzá's Partido Popular will fall quite some way short of a majority on 24 May. With the support of the C's, it might just be possible that it could get a coalition majority, but the C's leader in the Balearics, Xavier Pericay, has ruled out a pact with any party unless the C's wins the most votes at the election (which it won't). Nevertheless, Pericay has said that the C's might be willing to give parliamentary support without entering a formal coalition, but there is one very big string attached. Pericay is making a similar demand to the one in Andalusia regarding Chaves. He wants Bauzá to get rid of José María Rodríguez as president of the PP in Palma because of his association with corruption.
Whether this happens or not, the outcome of the Balearic election is likely to give the same sort of situation as there is in Andalusia, except that the PP is the ruling party and not PSOE. Bauzá would gain the most votes and seats, but he would have no coalition partner, while PSOE may not be able to form a coalition majority as an alternative. It has been mooted that Bauzá might look to form a minority government, but what would happen if he tried to? Díaz is finding it difficult, and so would Bauzá. Opposition parties in the Balearics will be looking at what is happening in Andalusia with keen interest and they might well, in the event that Bauzá tries to govern in minority, simply block his investiture. So, a further election this year might have to be held, but there is another factor which has entered the equation: it is now being openly talked about the PP getting rid of Bauzá.
The word is that senior figures in the PP would, if the party fails to gain at least 25 seats (and the polls suggest that it would not), call an extraordinary congress and elect a new leader. This still might not allow a presidential investiture to go ahead if a minority government was contemplated, but it would be more likely. Alternatives, including the current mayor of Palma, Mateo Isern, are being spoken about, and he would surely have no problem with ousting Rodríguez.
Polls aren't of course always right, but if they are, then there will be great uncertainty after 24 May, and Andalusia might just give a clue as to how uncertain things will be.
The parliament will hold another vote on Thursday. There may well be further votes but if, by the middle of July, Diáz has still not received support (or abstentions) that will enable her investiture, a new election will have to be called: those are the rules. Both Podemos and Ciudadanos have indicated a willingness to consider a pact - and the number of seats each has would be sufficient to create a majority - but there are strings attached. A fundamental principle of these two parties is their anti-corruption stance, and both have made it clear that a condition would be the removal of a former president, Manuel Chaves, from the national Congress of Deputies: he, as with Díaz's predecessor, is implicated in the enormous ERE (redundancy) scandal in Andalusia.
As things stand, Chaves will be on his way out after the Spanish general election in any event. Getting him to stand down now would, though, be symbolic: an act of commitment by PSOE to make a stand against corruption, alleged or otherwise. As this hasn't happened, neither Podemos nor Ciudadanos (C's) can accept entering into a coalition with Díaz.
The Chaves affair is just one way in which what is happening in Andalusia is similar to the Balearics. Here, the likelihood is that President Bauzá's Partido Popular will fall quite some way short of a majority on 24 May. With the support of the C's, it might just be possible that it could get a coalition majority, but the C's leader in the Balearics, Xavier Pericay, has ruled out a pact with any party unless the C's wins the most votes at the election (which it won't). Nevertheless, Pericay has said that the C's might be willing to give parliamentary support without entering a formal coalition, but there is one very big string attached. Pericay is making a similar demand to the one in Andalusia regarding Chaves. He wants Bauzá to get rid of José María Rodríguez as president of the PP in Palma because of his association with corruption.
Whether this happens or not, the outcome of the Balearic election is likely to give the same sort of situation as there is in Andalusia, except that the PP is the ruling party and not PSOE. Bauzá would gain the most votes and seats, but he would have no coalition partner, while PSOE may not be able to form a coalition majority as an alternative. It has been mooted that Bauzá might look to form a minority government, but what would happen if he tried to? Díaz is finding it difficult, and so would Bauzá. Opposition parties in the Balearics will be looking at what is happening in Andalusia with keen interest and they might well, in the event that Bauzá tries to govern in minority, simply block his investiture. So, a further election this year might have to be held, but there is another factor which has entered the equation: it is now being openly talked about the PP getting rid of Bauzá.
The word is that senior figures in the PP would, if the party fails to gain at least 25 seats (and the polls suggest that it would not), call an extraordinary congress and elect a new leader. This still might not allow a presidential investiture to go ahead if a minority government was contemplated, but it would be more likely. Alternatives, including the current mayor of Palma, Mateo Isern, are being spoken about, and he would surely have no problem with ousting Rodríguez.
Polls aren't of course always right, but if they are, then there will be great uncertainty after 24 May, and Andalusia might just give a clue as to how uncertain things will be.
Thursday, March 26, 2015
Misrepresentation Of The People
The Partido Popular has lost a vote in the Balearic parliament. It is the first vote that it has lost during this administration. It will be the last. It was a vote lost because despite the PP having a clear majority, the majority is too low. A qualified majority of two-thirds of the parliamentary deputies was required for them to act like turkeys, vote for Christmas and to see sixteen of their number removed from the chamber. The PP motion to cut parliamentary representation was always destined to fail. The party has no friends in parliament. The motion, the debate, the vote were no more than symbolic.
Nevertheless, the process was worthwhile. Before President Bauzá got it underway, had anyone stopped to ask why the Balearics needed 59 deputies? His opponents refused to back the motion because they feared that a reduction would merely strengthen the PP and would "alter the basic rules of Balearic democracy". Bauzá argued that it was only a cost-cutting exercise: an annual saving of seven million euros. Neither view focused on the core issue. Why 59? And neither view addressed an underlying issue. Just who do these 59 represent?
The opposition speak of basic rules of democracy, but what do they mean? The representation of the people in the Balearics is significantly greater than the Spanish benchmark of one parliamentary deputy per 40,000 people. Basic rules of democracy were not about to have been broken had the Balearics ratio changed from one deputy per 19,000 people to 1:26,000, which is what would have happened if the motion had been accepted. But whether 43 or 59 deputies, there is the subsidiary question - who do they actually represent?
At present in parliament there is only deputy who can be considered to in any way represent a constituency, and that is Margalida Font, the single deputy for the island of Formentera. None of the others can be, because no deputy, including Sra. Font, has a constituency. Comparing the parliamentary system here to the one in Britain may not be fair, and it would be wrong to assert that the British system is by any means perfect or truly representative, but the constituency basis of that system does give greater accountability: an MP is, not always in practice of course, accountable to his or her constituents. In the Balearics there aren't constituents to be accountable to. The consequence of this is that a deputy's allegiance is to the party and to the party alone. There are no constituents to muddy the waters and potentially divide that allegiance.
Coming back to the number of deputies, it is hard to accept the opposition's argument that democracy would somehow be diminished if there were fewer of them. By standards of other parts of Spain, the Balearic parliament is over-represented and would still have been with 16 fewer deputies. But over-representation, even at an unnecessary cost of seven million euros a year, is preferable to under-representation, which brings us to Andalusia.
There, the ratio of deputies to population is one per 77,000, almost double the national benchmark, and it has of course just had a parliamentary election. For a population approximately eight times greater than that of the Balearics, Andalusia doesn't even manage to have twice as many deputies: 109 play the Balearics 59. The representation, whether too little or too great, is cockeyed. And in Andalusia it will be even more so if Susana Díaz does as she has said she will, which is to govern in minority.
The PSOE minority in Andalusia isn't to the tune of one or two seats. It is eight short of the 55 needed for a majority, a far from insignificant shortfall in terms of what her PSOE colleagues in the Balearics might deem to be the "basic rules" of democracy. And the 47 seats have been gained with a percentage share of the vote of just over one-third. How can governing in minority when the minority is as small as it is be considered to be adequately representative? It can't be. Díaz's proposal, supported by PSOE's national leader, Pedro Sanchez, is little short of a disgrace.
Why does she appear intent on minority government and so on avoiding coalition partners? Let's hazard a guess. The partner would have to be one or other of Podemos or Ciudadanos, both of them rivals to PSOE nationally. The last thing PSOE wants at present is to give either of them the credibility that would come from inclusion in a coalition and so also potentially strengthen their support nationally. But between them, Podemos and Ciudadanos gained a quarter of the share of the vote. Denying either of them the chance to be in government would be a snub to the electorate and an abuse of the system of proportional representation.
Nevertheless, the process was worthwhile. Before President Bauzá got it underway, had anyone stopped to ask why the Balearics needed 59 deputies? His opponents refused to back the motion because they feared that a reduction would merely strengthen the PP and would "alter the basic rules of Balearic democracy". Bauzá argued that it was only a cost-cutting exercise: an annual saving of seven million euros. Neither view focused on the core issue. Why 59? And neither view addressed an underlying issue. Just who do these 59 represent?
The opposition speak of basic rules of democracy, but what do they mean? The representation of the people in the Balearics is significantly greater than the Spanish benchmark of one parliamentary deputy per 40,000 people. Basic rules of democracy were not about to have been broken had the Balearics ratio changed from one deputy per 19,000 people to 1:26,000, which is what would have happened if the motion had been accepted. But whether 43 or 59 deputies, there is the subsidiary question - who do they actually represent?
At present in parliament there is only deputy who can be considered to in any way represent a constituency, and that is Margalida Font, the single deputy for the island of Formentera. None of the others can be, because no deputy, including Sra. Font, has a constituency. Comparing the parliamentary system here to the one in Britain may not be fair, and it would be wrong to assert that the British system is by any means perfect or truly representative, but the constituency basis of that system does give greater accountability: an MP is, not always in practice of course, accountable to his or her constituents. In the Balearics there aren't constituents to be accountable to. The consequence of this is that a deputy's allegiance is to the party and to the party alone. There are no constituents to muddy the waters and potentially divide that allegiance.
Coming back to the number of deputies, it is hard to accept the opposition's argument that democracy would somehow be diminished if there were fewer of them. By standards of other parts of Spain, the Balearic parliament is over-represented and would still have been with 16 fewer deputies. But over-representation, even at an unnecessary cost of seven million euros a year, is preferable to under-representation, which brings us to Andalusia.
There, the ratio of deputies to population is one per 77,000, almost double the national benchmark, and it has of course just had a parliamentary election. For a population approximately eight times greater than that of the Balearics, Andalusia doesn't even manage to have twice as many deputies: 109 play the Balearics 59. The representation, whether too little or too great, is cockeyed. And in Andalusia it will be even more so if Susana Díaz does as she has said she will, which is to govern in minority.
The PSOE minority in Andalusia isn't to the tune of one or two seats. It is eight short of the 55 needed for a majority, a far from insignificant shortfall in terms of what her PSOE colleagues in the Balearics might deem to be the "basic rules" of democracy. And the 47 seats have been gained with a percentage share of the vote of just over one-third. How can governing in minority when the minority is as small as it is be considered to be adequately representative? It can't be. Díaz's proposal, supported by PSOE's national leader, Pedro Sanchez, is little short of a disgrace.
Why does she appear intent on minority government and so on avoiding coalition partners? Let's hazard a guess. The partner would have to be one or other of Podemos or Ciudadanos, both of them rivals to PSOE nationally. The last thing PSOE wants at present is to give either of them the credibility that would come from inclusion in a coalition and so also potentially strengthen their support nationally. But between them, Podemos and Ciudadanos gained a quarter of the share of the vote. Denying either of them the chance to be in government would be a snub to the electorate and an abuse of the system of proportional representation.
Monday, March 23, 2015
Andalusia Is Spain: Regional election
Andalusia is the Spain we were sold. When the country ended its exile, the world was sold Andalusia: a vivid kaleidoscope of reds, blacks, oranges and yellows. Flamenco, bullfighting, citrus and heat: searing heat. Where Europe met Africa, Andalusia was a place apart, the exotica of its imagery etched firmly into a foreign consciousness. Spain was Andalusia.
Andalusia is still a place apart. While the whole of Spain suffered because of economic crisis, Andalusia suffered more than most. But it has always suffered. For all its imagery, complemented by the Costa del Sol, the golf courses, the marinas, the grand cities, it has always been a poor region. GDP per capita is the second lowest in Spain; only its neighbour Extremadura is poorer. Not that help has not been forthcoming. Over the years, roughly 50,000 million euros of European funds have been spent on it, but it has never remotely looked like becoming "one of Europe's most prosperous regions", as its former president, Manuel Chaves, said that by 2020 it would be. Youth unemployment, at desperate levels because of crisis, were at their worst in Andalusia and still are. The young of Andalusia, seduced by the good money of construction for tourism and foreign property buyers, preferred the building site to education, but when the building stopped they had nowhere to go except back to their families when the houses they had bought with the wages of concrete and with all-too-easy mortgages were repossessed.
It is a place apart in a political sense. Since it obtained autonomous community status in 1981 and started to elect its own regional government the following year, Andalusia has never known anything other than socialism; the PSOE brand of socialism. On Sunday, the people of Andalusia voted, the opinion polls confident that the PSOE dynasty was not about to be ended.
Susana Díaz became president in September 2013 when José Griñán stepped down. In January she ended the coalition with the IU (United Left) that PSOE had been forced into after the last election. The relationship between the two parties had deteriorated, as had that between Díaz and the leader of the IU, Antonio Maíllo. An election had to be called. Two months before other regional elections, the interest in it has been greater than it would otherwise have been. Here was the first real measure of how Podemos would do. Here also was a test of the centre-left Ciudadanos, which has appeared from almost nowhere to feature significantly in national opinion polls. But here also were potential indications of what other elections - regional and national - might hold for PSOE and the Partido Popular. For PSOE, defeat in Andalusia would be unthinkable, but a lowering of its percentage of the vote in 2012 (39.6%) would border on the disastrous; a confirmation of the inroads made by Podemos. The PP would know that the 40.7% of the 2012 vote was going to slump. But by how much? Though a PSOE stronghold, its share of the vote had generally been an upward one since 1990 when it could only just muster 22%.
As things turned out, disaster did strike. Susana Díaz said the victory was "historic", and it was; historic in the low percentage of the vote. PSOE won the same number of seats (47) as in 2012, but its share of the vote was down by over 4%. For the PP, a loss of 14% and 17 seats was bad but not as bad as opinion polls had suggested. Podemos, as had been expected, came in third, its performance in line with those opinion polls (15 seats and almost 15% of the share of the vote). The Ciudadanos surge was not as great as had been predicted (9 seats and just over 9% of the vote).
So, how does one interpret all this as an indication of what might happen in the other elections to come? Because of the strength of PSOE in Andalusia, it was always going to win, and this despite the corruption cases that have afflicted it in the region. Its 35.4% share of the vote is vastly greater than how it is performing in national opinion polls, the latest three of which have given it an average 19.3% share, but it probably says very little about other elections, other than to confirm that PSOE has failed to reassert itself against the PP. It is a hollow victory, and the PSOE hierarchy will know that it is.
The PP's share of the vote, poor though it was, was higher than how it currently rates in national opinion polls. There may be some consolation in this but it is certainly not a performance that will fill it with confidence. For the PP, PSOE isn't really the threat; it is the other parties.
There is a misguided view that Podemos is only killing PSOE. This simply isn't so, as the loss of support that the PP is suffering is due in no small part to Podemos and others. For Podemos, the Andalusia vote went much as had been anticipated. The share of the vote is seven points lower than how it is rated in national opinion polls, but the strength of PSOE in Andalusia was always going to mean that it couldn't match these national levels.
It would be overstating things to say that Podemos was the real victor in Andalusia, but the vote proves that when the electorate turns up to vote it doesn't suddenly have a change of heart and opt instead for the status quo of one or other of the two main parties. Podemos, and to a lesser extent Ciudadanos, have genuinely arrived.
Andalusia, as it always has been, is a place apart. The election confirms this only in terms of PSOE's victory. Otherwise, the election shows that it is Spain, and for Spain, Andalusia now poses a big question - with which party does PSOE form a coalition? If it is Podemos, then the shape of Spain's politics for the next four to five years may well have been formed in Andalusia.
Andalusia is still a place apart. While the whole of Spain suffered because of economic crisis, Andalusia suffered more than most. But it has always suffered. For all its imagery, complemented by the Costa del Sol, the golf courses, the marinas, the grand cities, it has always been a poor region. GDP per capita is the second lowest in Spain; only its neighbour Extremadura is poorer. Not that help has not been forthcoming. Over the years, roughly 50,000 million euros of European funds have been spent on it, but it has never remotely looked like becoming "one of Europe's most prosperous regions", as its former president, Manuel Chaves, said that by 2020 it would be. Youth unemployment, at desperate levels because of crisis, were at their worst in Andalusia and still are. The young of Andalusia, seduced by the good money of construction for tourism and foreign property buyers, preferred the building site to education, but when the building stopped they had nowhere to go except back to their families when the houses they had bought with the wages of concrete and with all-too-easy mortgages were repossessed.
It is a place apart in a political sense. Since it obtained autonomous community status in 1981 and started to elect its own regional government the following year, Andalusia has never known anything other than socialism; the PSOE brand of socialism. On Sunday, the people of Andalusia voted, the opinion polls confident that the PSOE dynasty was not about to be ended.
Susana Díaz became president in September 2013 when José Griñán stepped down. In January she ended the coalition with the IU (United Left) that PSOE had been forced into after the last election. The relationship between the two parties had deteriorated, as had that between Díaz and the leader of the IU, Antonio Maíllo. An election had to be called. Two months before other regional elections, the interest in it has been greater than it would otherwise have been. Here was the first real measure of how Podemos would do. Here also was a test of the centre-left Ciudadanos, which has appeared from almost nowhere to feature significantly in national opinion polls. But here also were potential indications of what other elections - regional and national - might hold for PSOE and the Partido Popular. For PSOE, defeat in Andalusia would be unthinkable, but a lowering of its percentage of the vote in 2012 (39.6%) would border on the disastrous; a confirmation of the inroads made by Podemos. The PP would know that the 40.7% of the 2012 vote was going to slump. But by how much? Though a PSOE stronghold, its share of the vote had generally been an upward one since 1990 when it could only just muster 22%.
As things turned out, disaster did strike. Susana Díaz said the victory was "historic", and it was; historic in the low percentage of the vote. PSOE won the same number of seats (47) as in 2012, but its share of the vote was down by over 4%. For the PP, a loss of 14% and 17 seats was bad but not as bad as opinion polls had suggested. Podemos, as had been expected, came in third, its performance in line with those opinion polls (15 seats and almost 15% of the share of the vote). The Ciudadanos surge was not as great as had been predicted (9 seats and just over 9% of the vote).
So, how does one interpret all this as an indication of what might happen in the other elections to come? Because of the strength of PSOE in Andalusia, it was always going to win, and this despite the corruption cases that have afflicted it in the region. Its 35.4% share of the vote is vastly greater than how it is performing in national opinion polls, the latest three of which have given it an average 19.3% share, but it probably says very little about other elections, other than to confirm that PSOE has failed to reassert itself against the PP. It is a hollow victory, and the PSOE hierarchy will know that it is.
The PP's share of the vote, poor though it was, was higher than how it currently rates in national opinion polls. There may be some consolation in this but it is certainly not a performance that will fill it with confidence. For the PP, PSOE isn't really the threat; it is the other parties.
There is a misguided view that Podemos is only killing PSOE. This simply isn't so, as the loss of support that the PP is suffering is due in no small part to Podemos and others. For Podemos, the Andalusia vote went much as had been anticipated. The share of the vote is seven points lower than how it is rated in national opinion polls, but the strength of PSOE in Andalusia was always going to mean that it couldn't match these national levels.
It would be overstating things to say that Podemos was the real victor in Andalusia, but the vote proves that when the electorate turns up to vote it doesn't suddenly have a change of heart and opt instead for the status quo of one or other of the two main parties. Podemos, and to a lesser extent Ciudadanos, have genuinely arrived.
Andalusia, as it always has been, is a place apart. The election confirms this only in terms of PSOE's victory. Otherwise, the election shows that it is Spain, and for Spain, Andalusia now poses a big question - with which party does PSOE form a coalition? If it is Podemos, then the shape of Spain's politics for the next four to five years may well have been formed in Andalusia.
Friday, December 12, 2014
Tourism Promotion And Decree
In the past week we have witnessed a flurry of activity at the Balearics tourism ministry. First there was the announcement of the "158 actions" for tourism promotion in 2015 and then there was the tourism decree, both linked by the pressing concern to limit seasonality and both rather underwhelming. The promotional actions will continue the low-cost theme started two years ago of focusing on travel fairs and journalist/blogger famtrips (familiarisation trips), which are reasonable enough endeavours but ones which fail to impress an industry (and a wider public) that craves greater dynamism. The promotional spend, up by 10% to three million euros, is aimed at the niche products which form the core of off-season tourism, such as cycling, and this emphasis merely serves to reinforce an absence of promotion for the main season. The impression one has is that the good numbers of tourists in recent years has made the regional government believe that the summer sells itself, and up to a point the government would be right. However, this past season was notable for its unevenness; a record-breaking autumn but a slow spring. Sun and beach, much though tourism officials think otherwise - or wish otherwise - is key to the spring, far more so than the alternative, niche products. The experience of 2014 should tell these officials that a greater effort might be required in order to produce less unevenness.
The tourism decree, a headlining aspect of which was the offer of incentives for businesses that are open for a minimum of eight months, was essentially a reinforcement of what was already in the 2012 tourism law. As yet, there is little evidence to suggest that such an offer is having a great deal of impact. News from Santa Ponsa over the past few days which refers to a lengthening of the season would appear not to have been influenced by incentives but rather by hotelier initiative, and the news was really only to do with Pirates Village, which intends to open by mid-March, a season of seven and a half months until the end of October. Incentives may be welcome, but more is needed in order that greater numbers of hotels will open earlier than mid-March and indeed remain open into November. But then, I think we all know this to be the case and what prescriptions there might be.
To place the Balearics promotional spend in context, the Andalusian regional government is to spend 18 million euros as part of its "emergency plan" against seasonality. While the Balearics tourism ministry was issuing its "urgent measures" in the form of its decree, the Andalusians were clearly considering that there was far greater urgency required, and this for a region which already well outperforms the Balearics when it comes to off-season tourism. Andalusia is admittedly a much bigger region geographically than the Balearics, but a notable aspect of its plan (a "strategic objective", according to its tourism ministry) is the creation of a "network of municipalities against seasonality". Andalusia wants to involve as many stakeholders as it can, and these include the towns and cities. Compare this with the Balearics where all bets are on Palma and Palma alone and where, moreover, the bets are mostly made by the private sector without public funding. The Andalusian government is far more involved than the government in the Balearics, and the latest plan follows on from previous efforts to stimulate the off-season; Andalusia has been adopting incentives for businesses for longer than the Balearics.
One final note regarding the activity at the tourism ministry. Jaime Martínez may be able to boast that the number of promotional actions is to increase, but on one promotional front - that of the use of social media and web technology - he was silent. When, oh when are the Balearics going to catch up in this regard? We've been promised action, so where is it?
The tourism decree, a headlining aspect of which was the offer of incentives for businesses that are open for a minimum of eight months, was essentially a reinforcement of what was already in the 2012 tourism law. As yet, there is little evidence to suggest that such an offer is having a great deal of impact. News from Santa Ponsa over the past few days which refers to a lengthening of the season would appear not to have been influenced by incentives but rather by hotelier initiative, and the news was really only to do with Pirates Village, which intends to open by mid-March, a season of seven and a half months until the end of October. Incentives may be welcome, but more is needed in order that greater numbers of hotels will open earlier than mid-March and indeed remain open into November. But then, I think we all know this to be the case and what prescriptions there might be.
To place the Balearics promotional spend in context, the Andalusian regional government is to spend 18 million euros as part of its "emergency plan" against seasonality. While the Balearics tourism ministry was issuing its "urgent measures" in the form of its decree, the Andalusians were clearly considering that there was far greater urgency required, and this for a region which already well outperforms the Balearics when it comes to off-season tourism. Andalusia is admittedly a much bigger region geographically than the Balearics, but a notable aspect of its plan (a "strategic objective", according to its tourism ministry) is the creation of a "network of municipalities against seasonality". Andalusia wants to involve as many stakeholders as it can, and these include the towns and cities. Compare this with the Balearics where all bets are on Palma and Palma alone and where, moreover, the bets are mostly made by the private sector without public funding. The Andalusian government is far more involved than the government in the Balearics, and the latest plan follows on from previous efforts to stimulate the off-season; Andalusia has been adopting incentives for businesses for longer than the Balearics.
One final note regarding the activity at the tourism ministry. Jaime Martínez may be able to boast that the number of promotional actions is to increase, but on one promotional front - that of the use of social media and web technology - he was silent. When, oh when are the Balearics going to catch up in this regard? We've been promised action, so where is it?
Wednesday, August 20, 2014
The Joys Of Glamping
I confess to having a natural aversion to what I have long dubbed "brochure talk", a formulaic means of descriptive promotion, aided by a thesaurus with a select list of nouns and adjectives, which takes these nouns and adjectives and arranges them into meaningful sentences (usually meaningful) as needs require. Hence, the thesaurus contains emotive nouns such as "oasis" or adjectives like "ultimate".
While I consider brochure talk to be lazy, cliché-ridden and shallow, I can accept that not everyone might agree with me and that there may indeed be applications for which it is appropriate. And glamping may just be one of these. As far as I am aware, there isn't an oasis as such near to the "small, Spanish white pueblo named Alozaina ... (idyllic, peaceful and restful)", but I admit that it does sound somewhat appealing - a silver machine airstream mobile home that looks like a giant and kitsch-retro toaster parked in a craggy, pine-filled setting somewhere in remotest Andalusia.
Glamping - a neologism that combines glamour and camping - is, so we are being told, a genuine trend in sustainable tourism. As such, therefore, it must be "a good thing" because anything which is tagged sustainable is considered to be "a good thing". It is more than simply sustainable, though, and the clue lies with the glamour part of the neolexia. You can glamp - and I'm not sure, I may have invented a verb - in various parts of the globe, and the sustainably touristic glamour you receive in return for your desire to go glamping can be a yurt, an eco lodge, a treehouse or a very large Swan Essentials steel toaster with five-star interior.
Glamping.com's somewhat eccentric (nothing wrong with that) selection spans the globe, but in Spain it is confined to Andalusia. The offer is specialised glamping, but there is a less exclusive style which nonetheless adheres to the principle of the glamour part of the equation. Examples include the Jesolo International camp in Venice and the Marjal Costa Blanca Eco Camping Resort, which is not that far from Benidorm.
The attractions of this luxury style of camping lie, it is said, with an appeal to contemporary social and ecological consciences and to a demand for quality that doesn't break the bank (which might be the case with a hotel). There is an attraction, furthermore, for the vast majority of people (90% of the population of Europe, it is said) who have never had a camping holiday. While all of this may be true, if one is being picky, a social conscience might baulk at the all-inclusive nature of the Jesolo camp; it gives the impression of being something of a new-age Club Med minus the one-time sinful reputation.
If we are to believe the marketing psychographics gurus, the planet is now populated by a youthful Millennial generation for whom the holiday experience is as important as if not more important than the accommodation. It's probably all guff, but if there is some truth to it, then Glamping.com should appeal to this Millennial being. It offers, it says, "a discerning guide to experiential travel". One doesn't have to be a Millennial, however, to enjoy this new fad for eco-friendly, sustainably-correct, quasi-back-to-nature happy camping. Families, seniors, those with wads of cash are all equally likely to wish to partake. And why not? Camping, with or without five-star luxury, in or not within a toaster on wheels has much to commend it.
But sadly, this trend will not be coming to Mallorca any time soon. The new tourism law is dumb on the subject. Camping is a non-subject in Mallorca. It was officially airbrushed into almost total oblivion over 25 years ago, and it is highly unlikely that it would make a startling reappearance. Yet, there is a good clientele to be had from camping, while glamping would seem to fit well with the ministerial mantra that chants "quality tourist". However, as with the spare-cash-flush private apartment renter, the potential occupants of a luxury yurt encampment in Mallorca are non-persons where the ministry are concerned. And the ministry knows best, even at the expense of ignoring tourism trends and tourist wishes. Camping is not a hotel. It is the tourism anti-Christ where Mallorca is concerned, which is strange when the ministry can also chant "sustainability".
* Photo from www.glamping.com
Thursday, September 05, 2013
Supermarket Sweep And The Costs Of Education
Four years ago the Cruz Roja (Red Cross) in the Balearics was given school material to the value of 11,310 euros. This donation formed part of a benefit "return to school" campaign in which the Cruz Roja was also able to put out tables to receive personal donations of school materials, which were destined to go to hard-up families. These different donations were arranged by the charitable foundation operated by the Carrefour supermarket chain.
Last week, SAT, the Andalusian Workers' Union, organised a "raid" on a Carrefour supermarket in Seville. Activists swept through the store, lifting school materials that were to be given to families in need and which were said to have been worth around 2,000 euros. The union has asked the store to treat this haul of school materials as a donation.
Whether the store agrees or doesn't agree and so whether charges will be pressed or aren't pressed, SAT's act (and it is not the first time it has arranged such a raid on a store) was theft. Robin Hood it may have been, but it was still shoplifting.
One can appreciate that the raid was a spectacular way of drawing attention to the plight of needy families, and much though one might sympathise with these needy families and even with the action taken by SAT, it cannot be condoned. If it were to be, then what?
Carrefour in the Balearics showed four years ago that help can be arranged via normal charitable means. It didn't have to arrange such help and nor does it have to now. Retailers are not the cause of financial hardship, but they are in its frontline. SAT's raids earlier this year bagged food and other staple items that were intended for distribution to NGOs for their ultimate distribution to the needy. The NGOs, just like Carrefour, were placed in a very awkward position. Apart from anything else, they would have been liable for handling stolen goods. SAT's spectaculars are counterproductive, as they alienate the very organisations who shouldn't be alienated when it comes to helping the needy, and these include large retailers with charitable divisions.
There have been no raids of this type in Mallorca, but the fact that Carrefour was organising charitable acts demonstrated that economic crisis had made things difficult for families in the Balearics who were faced by the costs of their childrens' education. Four years on, things are more difficult.
The increase in IVA (VAT) last September meant that school materials were to attract 21% tax where they had only been taxed at 4% (books were kept at the 4% rate but other educational materials rose by 17%). Because the increase was well publicised, purchases could be made before the increase kicked in, but that was last year. Now, in addition to more expensive school materials, families in the Balearics face another additional cost, that of books in English to meet the demands of TIL (the "tratamiento integrado de lenguas"), which is the decree for trilingual education, meaning that certain classes will be taught in English. These books are more expensive than those in Castellano, in some instances by almost ten euros.
Consumer groups have estimated that the cost of this year's return to school will in any event rise by up to 3%. In itself this might not seem that burdensome, but household budgets, squeezed as they are, don't need further costs for textbooks in English as well.
The introduction of TIL seems to have overlooked the fact that families will have to spend more, just as it has overlooked some other factors, such as how ill-prepared some schools are to meet its demands. The Balearics High Court is going to have to move swiftly in making a decision whether to back a suspension to the implementation of TIL, as called for by unions which maintain that there has been insufficient time to prepare; the new school year starts on 13 September. Two unions have already announced that teachers will strike from that date.
The Balearic Government says that there is no "Plan B" if the TIL implementation is suspended. Whether it is suspended or not, the new school year, only a matter of a few days away, is likely to be chaotic.
I have in the past drawn attention to how news reports of this new school year are typified by announcements that the return to school has been "normal". I have often wondered what might constitute an abnormal return to school. It may be that, in Mallorca, I am about to find out. Meanwhile in Andalusia, the return to school is marked by raids on supermarkets.
Any comments to andrew@thealcudiaguide.com please.
Last week, SAT, the Andalusian Workers' Union, organised a "raid" on a Carrefour supermarket in Seville. Activists swept through the store, lifting school materials that were to be given to families in need and which were said to have been worth around 2,000 euros. The union has asked the store to treat this haul of school materials as a donation.
Whether the store agrees or doesn't agree and so whether charges will be pressed or aren't pressed, SAT's act (and it is not the first time it has arranged such a raid on a store) was theft. Robin Hood it may have been, but it was still shoplifting.
One can appreciate that the raid was a spectacular way of drawing attention to the plight of needy families, and much though one might sympathise with these needy families and even with the action taken by SAT, it cannot be condoned. If it were to be, then what?
Carrefour in the Balearics showed four years ago that help can be arranged via normal charitable means. It didn't have to arrange such help and nor does it have to now. Retailers are not the cause of financial hardship, but they are in its frontline. SAT's raids earlier this year bagged food and other staple items that were intended for distribution to NGOs for their ultimate distribution to the needy. The NGOs, just like Carrefour, were placed in a very awkward position. Apart from anything else, they would have been liable for handling stolen goods. SAT's spectaculars are counterproductive, as they alienate the very organisations who shouldn't be alienated when it comes to helping the needy, and these include large retailers with charitable divisions.
There have been no raids of this type in Mallorca, but the fact that Carrefour was organising charitable acts demonstrated that economic crisis had made things difficult for families in the Balearics who were faced by the costs of their childrens' education. Four years on, things are more difficult.
The increase in IVA (VAT) last September meant that school materials were to attract 21% tax where they had only been taxed at 4% (books were kept at the 4% rate but other educational materials rose by 17%). Because the increase was well publicised, purchases could be made before the increase kicked in, but that was last year. Now, in addition to more expensive school materials, families in the Balearics face another additional cost, that of books in English to meet the demands of TIL (the "tratamiento integrado de lenguas"), which is the decree for trilingual education, meaning that certain classes will be taught in English. These books are more expensive than those in Castellano, in some instances by almost ten euros.
Consumer groups have estimated that the cost of this year's return to school will in any event rise by up to 3%. In itself this might not seem that burdensome, but household budgets, squeezed as they are, don't need further costs for textbooks in English as well.
The introduction of TIL seems to have overlooked the fact that families will have to spend more, just as it has overlooked some other factors, such as how ill-prepared some schools are to meet its demands. The Balearics High Court is going to have to move swiftly in making a decision whether to back a suspension to the implementation of TIL, as called for by unions which maintain that there has been insufficient time to prepare; the new school year starts on 13 September. Two unions have already announced that teachers will strike from that date.
The Balearic Government says that there is no "Plan B" if the TIL implementation is suspended. Whether it is suspended or not, the new school year, only a matter of a few days away, is likely to be chaotic.
I have in the past drawn attention to how news reports of this new school year are typified by announcements that the return to school has been "normal". I have often wondered what might constitute an abnormal return to school. It may be that, in Mallorca, I am about to find out. Meanwhile in Andalusia, the return to school is marked by raids on supermarkets.
Any comments to andrew@thealcudiaguide.com please.
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